By: Morteza Aminmansour
Protecting Iranian interest in the Persian Gulf region:
Since the 1960s with the rise of Arab nationalism (Pan-Arabism), starting with Gamal Abdel Nasser's Arab Republic of Egyptt, some Arab countries, including the ones bordering the Persian Gulf, have adopted the term "Arabian Gulf" to refer to the waterway. This is controversial and not commonly used outside of the Arab world, nor is it recognized by the United Nations and other international organizations. The United Nations on many occasions has requested that only "Persian Gulf" be used as the official and standard geographical designation for the body of water. Iranian will never forget the threat of Nasser’s speech referring to its rival countries such as Israel and Iran. He said he would eat his breakfast in Israel and the lunch in Iran.
The Greek traveller of the 1st century A.D. has called the Red Sea as Arabian gulf; the Indian ocean has been named Aryateria Sea; the waters at Oman Coast is called Pars Sea; Barbarus region (between Oman and Yemen coast are called belonging to Pars, and the Gulf located at south side of Iran is named: Persian Gulf. By describing the water body, the life of Persians living at both sides have also been confirmed. Most recently, at the Twenty-third session of United Nation in March-April 2006, the name "Persian Gulf" was confirmed again as the legitimate and the official term to be used by members of United Nation.
The correct term for the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council (PGCC) is the Persian Gulf Arab States Cooperation Council. The Persian Gulf sits on top of the greatest pool of oil reserves in the world. Over the past few decades, it has been the site of two major wars (Iraq invaded Iran between 1980-88 and the Iraq invaded Kuwait) and the Islamic revolution, and political and economic developments that have affected every country in the world including the politic in the Persian Gulf Region. It is also the home of more than 118 million Muslims people, whose cultures extend back to the origins of recorded history. Now in the recent years western countries and United States were concern about Persian Gulf region and its security.
The three main problems likely to bedevil Persian Gulf security over the next several years will be Iraq's security dilemma because of American invasion , Iran's nuclear weapons program which will be resoleved in near future , and potential internal unrest in the countries of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council (PGCC): Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia (unemployment and social disparity,Execution of political prisoners , Misstreatment of women ), and the United Arab Emirates(bad threatment of foreign worker and also socisial disparity within the federation and raising the cost of living, increasing the number of political prisoners, torture and bad treament of prisoners,domestic violance ,Bad treatment of women as second class in the socialty). These problems offer no easy answers separately, let alone together. Difficult tradeoffs will have to be made.
Resolving potential sources of conflict with the Arab world is not only in Iran’s strategic and economic interest also in the best interest of Arabs sough of the Persian Gulf as well. Iran has worked hard since 1997 to improve its relations with the Arab world and this effort has been partially successful because of the foreign policy of Khatami). Preserving and improving these relations is in Iran’s long-term interest. Iran should choose a strategy for protecting the name of Persian Gulf that will be compatible with this objective. Negotiation and direct talks with the Arab world should come as the priority of Iranian foreign policies before threats and boycotts. We have to remember that in USA and the rest of the world the global economy built over the past 50 years rests on a foundation of inexpensive, plentiful oil. If that foundation were removed, the global economy would collapse. This Fondation is setting of the lands in Persian Gulf countries , which are having difficulties because of human right abuses and other serious issues (Saudi Arabia , UAE).
It is true that 25 percent of the world's oil production comes from the Persian Gulf, with Saudi Arabia alone responsible for about 15 percent. The Persian Gulf has as much as two-thirds of the world's proven oil reserves, and its oil is absurdly economical to produce. Saudi Arabia has a majority of the world's excess production capacity, and it increases or decreases production to stabilize and control prices. Destabilization of saudi’s regime would be a great danger for the world economy and also for the region itselfes. The sudden loss of the Saudi oil network enen for a short period of time would send the price of oil through the ceiling, probably causing a global downturn at least as devastating as the Great Depression of the 1930s that we experienced. .It is in the best interest of Iran in long term to cooperate with the countries in the persian gulf also for them to stay on the same Route with Iran. That would be beneficial for Arabs and also Iranian with 70 million people the largest country in the Region in population and area.
The Iranian people are deeply unhappy with the current Government and its reactionary clerics who cling to power in Tehran, and since 1997 they have voted consistently and overwhelmingly against the hard-liners and they are mostly in favour of more moderate and understandable government . Iran's population is young (half of the population were born after revolution , and the Iranian youth most strongly oppose the current regime and favor a more democratic system of government. Thus time is on the side of Iran's reformers, most of whom have expressed an interest in good relations with the United States and the rest of the world (especially western countries which have common ground more ties in cultural and educational fields).
It is in the best interest of United States to address the rise of terrorism in the countries in persian gulf and the threat of internal instability in Saudi Arabia and the other PGCC states. For United States would be better to reduce dramatically its military presence in the Persian Gulf region, even to withdraw entirely So it will reduce the tension in the region. The heavy presence of U.S. troops fuels the terrorists' propaganda claims and is a humiliating for united states and other western countries . So pulling back would ease the internal pressure on the regimes and help them enact vital but painful reforms in a frametime . But, as noted, a withdrawal would be the best move from the different perspective that will bring more trust and stablity in the region. And gives the greatest assurance to iranian, that they will not be attacked by Us and their allies in the region. We need a common ground with other persian Gulf countries which can be provided in a respectfull manner when gives a garrantee to the security of Iran and respect iranian integrity.
In the persian gulf, a security condominium would bring together the United States,the Pgcc countries, Iraq, and Iran. The parties would first establish a regional security forum in which to debate relevant issues, exchange information, and frame agreements. They could move on to confidence-building measures, such as notification of exercises and exchanges of observers, and ultimately to arms control, including demilitarized zones, bans on destabilizing weapons systems, and balanced force reductions for all.
Other area of interest would be the Establishment of economic cooperation organization, allowing ownership of non-movable properties, joint investment in oil and gas resources on bilateral and multi-lateral basis, planning free trade among the states within the members, supply of water and gas, activation of the North-South corridor in transportation (Sea, land, Air), expansion of tourism, establishment of an security cooperation organization, educational, scientific, technological and research exchanges, and cooperation in protecting Persian Gulf and Oman Sea environment. , Cancellation of visa to ease visits by citizens of the seven countries. Single currency among them. Fighting the terrorism.
Sources:
*How should Iran preserve the name of the Persian Gulf? Nader Habibi (he is an economist with concentration on Middle East economies).
*Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.
Securing the Persian Gulf: Washington Must Manage Both External Aggression and Internal Instability
Tuesday, May 6, 2008
small island and big politic in the persian gulf
By: Morteza Aminmansour
Small Island and big politic in the Persian Gulf:
Case study three Iranian islands.
Iranian island Abu Musa, an island in the Persian Gulf, is claimed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE). These two countries for economic, security, and environmental reasons value the island. One significant feature about this island is that it is potentially full of oil reserves. Currently, oil is being extracted from a field close to the shores of Abu Musa. Although there was an agreement between Iran and great Britain in the year 1971 that confirmed the Iranian ownership of the Abu Musa island and also greater and leaser tonb, the dispute over these 3 Iranian island is unresolved due to the claims of UAE over these islands and could ignite an international crisis at some point in the future. In addition to the conflict, there are also environmental concerns that are associated with Abu Musa. If there were to be an oil spill on or around this island it could have grave consequences on the environment and the nearby animal life. Therefore, the dispute over Abu Musa will be examined for its importance in trade, environmental, and security issues in the near future.
Abu Musa gives Iran a base for projecting its power and influence south toward the PGCC. Situated at the mouth of the narrows of the Strait of Hormuz, of the Persian Gulf, through which passes a fifth of the worlds oil supplies.
Iranian island Abu Musa, which is only a few miles square, lies in the Persian Gulf about halfway between Iran and the UAE. However. Abu Musa is full of oil reserves, which fuel the economies of both Iran and the UAE. In addition, the island is located in the Strait of Hormuz, the mouth of the Persian Gulf.
This strategic position could allow a country to influence the Persian Gulf Valuable shipping lane, Abu Musa (called Abu Musa in Arabic by UAE and Jazireh-ye Abu Musa in Persian by Iran) has a population of around 600 people, and is situated at the mouth of the narrows of the Strait of Hormuz.The largest of these three islands Abu Musa covers an area of 12 sq kms. with a diameter of 5 kms. It is roughly circular in shape. The highest elevation is about 110 meters, obtains toward the northern part of the Island at Halva peak (Jebel Halwa). The mountains end as rocky cliffs or steep promontories at the north, while at the mouths of the valleys are sandy beaches at the south. Like the other islands in the Persian Gulf enjoys warm and humid climate. The annual precipitation is over 100 mm².Abu Musa is notable for its golden, sandy beaches and for its authentic natural beauty. In the west and southwest is Abu Musa town, the capital of the island and its most important harbor. Fishing is the major industry on this island. There are few significant resources on the islands apart from red oxide (coloring pigment) and oil, and only Abu Musa can accommodate large ships.
The island's population was estimated at 800 (2004). The northern sector of the island consists of housing units built for Iranian military personnel and civil service employees who were deployed to the region to protect IRAN against any aggression from Arab countries on the sought side of PERSIAN GULF, and the area is served by electricity, desalinated water, wells, farms, mosques, schools, general services, an infirmary, and a ferry and air link to Bandar Abbas on the Iranian mainland. The population of this sector was less than fifty in the early 1980s, but by the last year of the Iran-Iraq war in 1987 the Iranian military stationed there numbered 700. In 1995 IRAN increased its military presence to 4,000 and deployed a variety of missiles on the island. The airport opened in March 1996. The southern (Sharjah) sector of the island consists of Abu Musa Town; it is linked to the Arabian mainland by boat service. In the 1980s its population peaked at between 850 and 1,000, due mainly to the influx of tourists from the Arabian littoral. The town is served by a number of compounds, an electricity generating plant, and a desalination facility. The island's offshore oil and gas deposit, the Mubarak Field, is an area of 15 sq. mi. located 6 miles (9.6 km) off the eastern shore of the island. According to U.S. sources, its oil output is reported to be a maximum of 35,000 barrels per day.
By the end of November 1971, the conflict over the island reached a pitch. On November 29, Iran and Britain announced an agreement calling for Iran sovereignty over Abu Musa and Iran to station military forces on the island. Oil revenues from the oil fields surrounding the island would be shared by IRAN and Sharjah On November 30, Iran sent military forces to Abu Musa, in accordance with its agreement with Sharjah and took control of the two nearby Iranian islands(lesser and greater Tonb). Iran's Control over its territory ( of these three islands) caused a reaction in the Arab world. Iraq built up its port and naval facilities at Umm Qasr, and the UAE was formed as a federation of five trucial sheikdoms(after signing the agreement between IRAN and Britain , which Iran allowed citizen of Arab state Sharjah to live and stay on Iranian territory). The British are playing a two-sided and mostly anti-Iranian game in these regards. They have already cast doubt on one of the most important sources of Iran's claim by saying that the old map of the British Authorities in India (the map that was formally presented to Iranian officials as the expression of the maritime situation in the region and it showed the three concerned islands in the color of mainland Iran) was not official. Also, they are not ready to give clear explanations about the "package deal" that resulted in Iran's withdrawal of claims over Bahrain and get its soverrgnty back in the three islands. It needs to be mentioned that the agreement between Iran and Britain was signed before UAE was recognized as independent country in other word the UAE even did not exist on the map of Persian Gulf.
In fact the story of Bahrain's independence was a clear indication of the package deal (it was a big mistake of Iranian government at the time to recognize Bahrain and allow its separation from motherland IRAN). For the same reason the UAE's advocates have always tried to deny the existence of the package deal between Iran and the British authorities that led to the independence of Bahrain, UAE and restoration of Iranian rights in the Persian Gulf over the Tunbs and Abu-Musa.
According to Persian Journal Dec 27, 2005 Bahman Aghai Diba: The Arab countries never accepted the rights of the Iranians in any field. The Arabs, including the Palestinians, have never staged a rally or even uttered a word in support of Iranian rights. These are the Arabs that have difficulties for agreeing on the smallest political issue in the world. But they have unity in one point: Iran is like Israel occupier of the Arab lands and she must hand over the concerned territory to the "Arab brothers.” It is very misfortunate and embarrassing for the people of Iran to see that their so-called Islamic government keeps defending the rights of Arabs, tries to expand Arabization in Iran, and tries to persuade the cult of disgusting Arab figures (even in the cost of setting aside the Iranian historical figures that have fought against the Arab control on Iran and have succeeded to stop Iran becoming consumed by the Arab invaders, as it has happened in Egypt and Syria and many other places). At the same time, no Arab country, group, company, sect, or individual has ever taken any action or said a word in defense of the Iranian side. Iran has gone through enough troubles to take its islands back. Iran was instrumental in independence of the UAE, which includes the Sharejeh. The British Government has accepted the package deal tacitly.
There are many historical documents signed by IRANIAN and British Government for proving the rights of Iran over three islands in Persian Gulf. Unfortunately the UAE by raising an unjustifiable claim is creating problems in the Persian Gulf region. UAE instead of pursuing and protecting its security within the context of promoting regional cooperation, through making such claims, which lack historical, geographical and legal basis, is hindering regional cooperation and blaming IRAN for that. By trying to politicize and internationalize its claim, the UAE is in fact upsetting the regional security. Some prominent Arab politicians who have been influenced by the UAE propaganda, have raised questions which prompted IRAN to go to historical and geographical details of the matter in the last few years to prove and present facts and documents rightfulness of Iran's stance over the this issue (Iranian ownership over three islands).
According to Dr. Pirooz Mojtehedzadeh: We should remember that these insulting statements every year by PCCC are signed by foreign ministers of countries which claim to be friends of Iran. There is nothing against Iran-Arab cooperation, rather considering such friendly relations vital for both sides. IRAN should treat them as they treat us. In dealing with those who attack our national prestige and territorial integrity, our silence will motivate them to go as far as making claims over our capital city. Unfortunately, these countries in dealing with Israel have proved that they only bow to force and the problem is that IRAN is not a bullying country.
The latest statement goes against the apparent desire to solve the issue peacefully and through negotiation. Such stances are in the interest of American and other European circles which want to create tension in the Persian Gulf region to justify the continued presence of the their military forces in the Region. Iran does not need to sit on the table to negotiate over its territory and integrity. Iran is a sovergn country. IRAN is not listening to the wish of some puppet countries sought of Persian Gulf. They better take care of own internal and Arab-Israeli problem instead of unjustified claiming over Iranian Islands.
Sources:
Dr. Pirooz Mojtehedzadeh: Iranian island in the Persian gulf
Persian Journal ^ Dec 27, 2005 Dr Bahman Aghai Diba:
Iranian Islands in the Persian Gulf and the Arabs
Dan Caldwell, "Flashpoints in the Gulf: Abu Musa and the Tunb Islands." Middle East Policy,
Barry May, "Hormuz choke-point for half world's oil exports
Harold Hough, "Iranian Intentions-The Strait of Hormuz or Beyond?" Jane's Intelligence Review Island Dispute Between Iran and the UAE
Small Island and big politic in the Persian Gulf:
Case study three Iranian islands.
Iranian island Abu Musa, an island in the Persian Gulf, is claimed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE). These two countries for economic, security, and environmental reasons value the island. One significant feature about this island is that it is potentially full of oil reserves. Currently, oil is being extracted from a field close to the shores of Abu Musa. Although there was an agreement between Iran and great Britain in the year 1971 that confirmed the Iranian ownership of the Abu Musa island and also greater and leaser tonb, the dispute over these 3 Iranian island is unresolved due to the claims of UAE over these islands and could ignite an international crisis at some point in the future. In addition to the conflict, there are also environmental concerns that are associated with Abu Musa. If there were to be an oil spill on or around this island it could have grave consequences on the environment and the nearby animal life. Therefore, the dispute over Abu Musa will be examined for its importance in trade, environmental, and security issues in the near future.
Abu Musa gives Iran a base for projecting its power and influence south toward the PGCC. Situated at the mouth of the narrows of the Strait of Hormuz, of the Persian Gulf, through which passes a fifth of the worlds oil supplies.
Iranian island Abu Musa, which is only a few miles square, lies in the Persian Gulf about halfway between Iran and the UAE. However. Abu Musa is full of oil reserves, which fuel the economies of both Iran and the UAE. In addition, the island is located in the Strait of Hormuz, the mouth of the Persian Gulf.
This strategic position could allow a country to influence the Persian Gulf Valuable shipping lane, Abu Musa (called Abu Musa in Arabic by UAE and Jazireh-ye Abu Musa in Persian by Iran) has a population of around 600 people, and is situated at the mouth of the narrows of the Strait of Hormuz.The largest of these three islands Abu Musa covers an area of 12 sq kms. with a diameter of 5 kms. It is roughly circular in shape. The highest elevation is about 110 meters, obtains toward the northern part of the Island at Halva peak (Jebel Halwa). The mountains end as rocky cliffs or steep promontories at the north, while at the mouths of the valleys are sandy beaches at the south. Like the other islands in the Persian Gulf enjoys warm and humid climate. The annual precipitation is over 100 mm².Abu Musa is notable for its golden, sandy beaches and for its authentic natural beauty. In the west and southwest is Abu Musa town, the capital of the island and its most important harbor. Fishing is the major industry on this island. There are few significant resources on the islands apart from red oxide (coloring pigment) and oil, and only Abu Musa can accommodate large ships.
The island's population was estimated at 800 (2004). The northern sector of the island consists of housing units built for Iranian military personnel and civil service employees who were deployed to the region to protect IRAN against any aggression from Arab countries on the sought side of PERSIAN GULF, and the area is served by electricity, desalinated water, wells, farms, mosques, schools, general services, an infirmary, and a ferry and air link to Bandar Abbas on the Iranian mainland. The population of this sector was less than fifty in the early 1980s, but by the last year of the Iran-Iraq war in 1987 the Iranian military stationed there numbered 700. In 1995 IRAN increased its military presence to 4,000 and deployed a variety of missiles on the island. The airport opened in March 1996. The southern (Sharjah) sector of the island consists of Abu Musa Town; it is linked to the Arabian mainland by boat service. In the 1980s its population peaked at between 850 and 1,000, due mainly to the influx of tourists from the Arabian littoral. The town is served by a number of compounds, an electricity generating plant, and a desalination facility. The island's offshore oil and gas deposit, the Mubarak Field, is an area of 15 sq. mi. located 6 miles (9.6 km) off the eastern shore of the island. According to U.S. sources, its oil output is reported to be a maximum of 35,000 barrels per day.
By the end of November 1971, the conflict over the island reached a pitch. On November 29, Iran and Britain announced an agreement calling for Iran sovereignty over Abu Musa and Iran to station military forces on the island. Oil revenues from the oil fields surrounding the island would be shared by IRAN and Sharjah On November 30, Iran sent military forces to Abu Musa, in accordance with its agreement with Sharjah and took control of the two nearby Iranian islands(lesser and greater Tonb). Iran's Control over its territory ( of these three islands) caused a reaction in the Arab world. Iraq built up its port and naval facilities at Umm Qasr, and the UAE was formed as a federation of five trucial sheikdoms(after signing the agreement between IRAN and Britain , which Iran allowed citizen of Arab state Sharjah to live and stay on Iranian territory). The British are playing a two-sided and mostly anti-Iranian game in these regards. They have already cast doubt on one of the most important sources of Iran's claim by saying that the old map of the British Authorities in India (the map that was formally presented to Iranian officials as the expression of the maritime situation in the region and it showed the three concerned islands in the color of mainland Iran) was not official. Also, they are not ready to give clear explanations about the "package deal" that resulted in Iran's withdrawal of claims over Bahrain and get its soverrgnty back in the three islands. It needs to be mentioned that the agreement between Iran and Britain was signed before UAE was recognized as independent country in other word the UAE even did not exist on the map of Persian Gulf.
In fact the story of Bahrain's independence was a clear indication of the package deal (it was a big mistake of Iranian government at the time to recognize Bahrain and allow its separation from motherland IRAN). For the same reason the UAE's advocates have always tried to deny the existence of the package deal between Iran and the British authorities that led to the independence of Bahrain, UAE and restoration of Iranian rights in the Persian Gulf over the Tunbs and Abu-Musa.
According to Persian Journal Dec 27, 2005 Bahman Aghai Diba: The Arab countries never accepted the rights of the Iranians in any field. The Arabs, including the Palestinians, have never staged a rally or even uttered a word in support of Iranian rights. These are the Arabs that have difficulties for agreeing on the smallest political issue in the world. But they have unity in one point: Iran is like Israel occupier of the Arab lands and she must hand over the concerned territory to the "Arab brothers.” It is very misfortunate and embarrassing for the people of Iran to see that their so-called Islamic government keeps defending the rights of Arabs, tries to expand Arabization in Iran, and tries to persuade the cult of disgusting Arab figures (even in the cost of setting aside the Iranian historical figures that have fought against the Arab control on Iran and have succeeded to stop Iran becoming consumed by the Arab invaders, as it has happened in Egypt and Syria and many other places). At the same time, no Arab country, group, company, sect, or individual has ever taken any action or said a word in defense of the Iranian side. Iran has gone through enough troubles to take its islands back. Iran was instrumental in independence of the UAE, which includes the Sharejeh. The British Government has accepted the package deal tacitly.
There are many historical documents signed by IRANIAN and British Government for proving the rights of Iran over three islands in Persian Gulf. Unfortunately the UAE by raising an unjustifiable claim is creating problems in the Persian Gulf region. UAE instead of pursuing and protecting its security within the context of promoting regional cooperation, through making such claims, which lack historical, geographical and legal basis, is hindering regional cooperation and blaming IRAN for that. By trying to politicize and internationalize its claim, the UAE is in fact upsetting the regional security. Some prominent Arab politicians who have been influenced by the UAE propaganda, have raised questions which prompted IRAN to go to historical and geographical details of the matter in the last few years to prove and present facts and documents rightfulness of Iran's stance over the this issue (Iranian ownership over three islands).
According to Dr. Pirooz Mojtehedzadeh: We should remember that these insulting statements every year by PCCC are signed by foreign ministers of countries which claim to be friends of Iran. There is nothing against Iran-Arab cooperation, rather considering such friendly relations vital for both sides. IRAN should treat them as they treat us. In dealing with those who attack our national prestige and territorial integrity, our silence will motivate them to go as far as making claims over our capital city. Unfortunately, these countries in dealing with Israel have proved that they only bow to force and the problem is that IRAN is not a bullying country.
The latest statement goes against the apparent desire to solve the issue peacefully and through negotiation. Such stances are in the interest of American and other European circles which want to create tension in the Persian Gulf region to justify the continued presence of the their military forces in the Region. Iran does not need to sit on the table to negotiate over its territory and integrity. Iran is a sovergn country. IRAN is not listening to the wish of some puppet countries sought of Persian Gulf. They better take care of own internal and Arab-Israeli problem instead of unjustified claiming over Iranian Islands.
Sources:
Dr. Pirooz Mojtehedzadeh: Iranian island in the Persian gulf
Persian Journal ^ Dec 27, 2005 Dr Bahman Aghai Diba:
Iranian Islands in the Persian Gulf and the Arabs
Dan Caldwell, "Flashpoints in the Gulf: Abu Musa and the Tunb Islands." Middle East Policy,
Barry May, "Hormuz choke-point for half world's oil exports
Harold Hough, "Iranian Intentions-The Strait of Hormuz or Beyond?" Jane's Intelligence Review Island Dispute Between Iran and the UAE
American involement &its strategy in the persian gulf
American Involvement &its Oil Strategy in the Persian Gulf region:
Over the next 20 years, the portion of Western Europe’s total oil consumption imported from the Persian Gulf will increase to 35 percent, compared to 14 percent for the United States. By 2015, Persian Gulf exports will meet roughly half of all global oil consumption needs and will become the predominant source to which the Asia-Pacific region will turn to fill its burgeoning energy demands. Consequently, the perception is likely to arise that a serious interruption of Persian Gulf oil supplies would cause severe economic and financial dislocation as well as political and social instability in the developing world, and this in turn could generate pressure for Western military action.
In matters of oil, the Region. The Persian Gulf will remain the main source of Western energy supplies over the next decade . The Persian Gulf region has grabbed the greatest global attention during the past 50 years.
It will remain critical for future energy supplies. In a way, all the scrambling to develop resources around the world today is intended to delay the day of reckoning. Although the Persian Gulf produces a quarter of world oil supplies, it holds between two-thirds and three-quarters of all known oil reserves. For that reason the United States and the West have continued to define the region as being vitally important.
During this time, the US administration has seemingly vacillated between ratcheting up its aggressive rhetoric and offering a more conciliatory approach toward Iran. For instance, in March 2007, the U.S. Navy initiated a major exercise in the Persian Gulf designed to send a message to the Iranians, while reassuring “regional audiences” about the capabilities and determination of U.S. forces. The timetable for the exercise, which had been previously scheduled, was accelerated in part as a response to the Iran’s refusal to curtail its nuclear programs.
According to Shibley Telhami :This region is vitally important, however, does not automatically lead to the conclusion that a large military presence is required there—or to serious questions about the continued availability of this oil on the world market. This seeming revelation has recently provoked a debate in Washington, one focused especially on Saudi Arabia, which alone holds a quarter of the world's known oil reserves. Two central questions have been whether the United States needs to have a military presence in the region at all and whether our primary aim has been to defend Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states with whom we now discover we have serious policy disagreements. Moreover, many commentators, frustrated with the tension in relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia, have stepped up calls for weaning the United States of foreign oil broadly and of Persian Gulf oil in particular. But the debate entirely misses the logic of the American involvement.
First of all, buying oil from Persian Gulf region other than the Middle East will not resolve the problem. As the adage reminds us, "we are all sipping from the same cup." The oil market is seamless and is largely driven by supply and demand. Persian Gulf supplies affect the price of Persian Gulf oil, yes, but also the price of global oil. And while the United States can and should conserve energy and develop alternate energy sources, the gap between what the United States now produces and what it consumes (nearly 10 million barrels a day) is simply too wide to be bridged. Moreover, the clustering of the reserves in the Middle East also means that at some point in the not too distant future, a greater share of the oil supply will inescapably be coming from that region.
Nonetheless, it is not entirely clear why oil economics should be mixed with oil politics or what necessitates a military strategy at all. Indeed, many countries that depend heavily on Persian Gulf oil countries such as Japan and many countries in Europe—have assumed that they can base their policy entirely on the demands of the market without seeing a need for political and military intervention. This attitude may in part be driven by their taking the United States for granted and assuming that US will do the job to the benefit of all consumers. But there is more to it than that. Outside the United States the view is growing that assuring the flow of oil does not require a significant military strategy. This view is bolstered by historical trends. With the exception of the 1973 Arab oil embargo, which was politically motivated and which led to extraordinary increases in oil prices, long-term evidence suggests that the market, more than any other issue, determines trends in oil prices. Historically, political alliances have not greatly altered patterns of trade between the oil countries and the rest of the world. Oil producers sell oil to the countries that need it and are willing to pay the price and import the best products they can from the best sources they can find. The same was true even during the Cold War years, when political relationships were obviously not central to the oil producers' trading behavior. The bottom line was that these states did what was in their economic interest, regardless of their political orientation.
IRAN has never manifested itself as a serious threat to the national security of the United States, or by extension as a security threat to global security. At the height of Iran’s “exportation of the Islamic Revolution” phase, in the mid-1980’s, the Islamic Republic demonstrated a less-than-impressive ability to project its power beyond the immediate borders of Iran, and even then this projection was limited to war-torn Lebanon.
The situation the United States confronts in the Persian Gulf is therefore rich with irony: In the most challenging though unlikely scenario—large-scale of Iranian conventional attack—some allies will probably be willing to contribute to military operations to defend important Western interests. In the more likely but less serious contingencies, however, the United States will probably bear most or the entire military burden alone. Participation in the defense of the Persian Gulf
Will be a matter of choice rather than obligation for America’s European allies—and most are likely either to opt out or to commit only token forces.
After the 1991 Persian Gulf War, with momentum on the rise for deploying American forces and establishing what amounted to a new fleet in the Persian Gulf region, some observers believed that the increased American presence would give the United States a decided advantage over Europe and Japan in trade with the Persian Gulf states. In some instances, no doubt, Washington was able to use its political leverage to help American businesses win contracts in the region, especially in the military and aerospace arenas. But at the aggregate level, the trade figures between the region and the rest of the world show that the United States had no visible advantage. The year before Iraq invaded Kuwait(in 1989), The Figures show that European exports to the Middle East stood at $40.2 billion, as against $13.7 billion for the United States. The year after the Persian Gulf War(in 1992), Europe's export total was $57.2 billion, as against $19.9 billion for the United States. And the trend continued. In 2000, Europe shipped $63.7 billion of exports to the Middle East; the United States, $23.0 billion.
A wide gap currently separates U.S. and European perspectives and policies toward the Persian Gulf, notwithstanding their shared interest in secure oil supplies. NATO faces severe institutional limitations on a formal role in Persian Gulf defense, reflecting widespread apprehension on the part of European governments and publics about becoming entangled in security commitments and military operations outside Europe. Likewise, individual allied governments—with the exception of the U.K. and France—generally have little stomach for engaging in such operations outside the Alliance framework.
The reasons for these attitudes are not difficult to understand: many European governments do not share the United States’ view on the nature of Western interests in the region, the nature of the threats to those interests, and the most effective means of responding to such threats. In particular, many allied governments, believing that the United States has exaggerated the Iraqi
And Iranian military threat, prefer strategies of constructive “engagement” rather than “containment” to cope with the broader security challenges posed by these states. In addition, there is still a lingering fear in Europe that the United States will embroil European countries in conflicts that do not involve threats to their vital interests.
Maintaining the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf costs upward of $60 billion a year. Because these forces can also be used elsewhere, that sum is not entirely spent on defending the region. Still, one wonders why the United States devotes so much of its resources, energies, and war planning to the Persian Gulf. Would it not be more sensible to leave the oil issue to market forces and to leave politics out of it?
As conventionally understood, the American strategy is based on a resolve to assure the flow of oil to the West at reasonable prices—a resolve that extends to mitigating short-term interruptions in oil supply and subsequent spikes in pricing by relying on states, notably Saudi Arabia, that have excess capacity. (This alone requires Saudi-U.S. cooperation to assure that the Saudi capacity is used as a moderating force on the oil market.) But for more than half a century a central drive behind the American military strategy in the oil-rich region—one that has been not fully understood by most analysts—has been to deny the control of such vast resources to powerful enemies who would thereby become even more powerful and thus more threatening.
.Today, the prevailing perception in Washington is that Iran is aggressive (according to US department), dangerous country. Deterring its ability to encroach on Saudi oil fields—hence denying these states additional oil revenues—is one aim of the continuing American presence in the Persian Gulf region. The underlying concern is not just about possible disruptions in oil supplies, and ensuing price shocks, that the actions of hostile regimes could occasion. The larger issue, from the standpoint of the United States, is that if Iran were able to enrich them by taking control of additional oil reserves, this regime would soon become more menacing to the United States than already is, even if it were eager to sell to the rest of the world all the oil it seized.
The extent to which Iran is a threat will remain a matter of debate. Does it pose a threat to the United States? Or is the U.S. concern more for its Arab friends (sought of Persian Gulf Such as UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and Saudi Arabia) in the region, especially Israel, for whom IRAN is potential threats?? It is hard to imagine the circumstances under which the current government in Iran will be seen as anything less than aggressive and threatening (according to US department). This outlook makes it likely that any American administration in the foreseeable future will continue to try to prevent IRAN from coming to control the bulk of the world's known oil reserves—independent of U.S. concern for friendly Arab governments in the Persian Gulf.
But whatever the reasoning behind the American military strategy (US policy on IRAN), it remains in the interest of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council states to have American military backing. That gives the United States some leverage, but only up to a point since PGCC states know that the U.S. strategy also serves American interests. The result is clear mutual incentives to cooperate. Certainly, when threats to oil are clear, as in the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Saudi Arabia and other PGCC states will undoubtedly rally behind the United States to defend the oil fields. And even without imminent threat, PGCC states, especially Kuwait, have an interest in the U.S. presence in the region. U.S. forces are spread throughout much of the Persian Gulf, from prepositioned equipment in Qatar, to forces and equipment in Kuwait, to the naval facilities in Bahrain (former Iranian province until 1970,s. The Saudis, who also host American troops, have incentives to maintain an American presence in the Persian Gulf region even as they seek to lower the numbers and the profile of American forces on their own soil for fear of public backlash. But in the months since September 11, the American Saudis have discovered that their public perception of the illegitimacy of the presence on their soil is a threat to them as well as to that presence—just as the United States has discovered the depth of public resentment in the Persian gulf region. This will necessitate mutual cooperation. The Saudis will have to transmit to their public the sort of friendship with America that has existed at the governmental level, and the United States will need to work with them to reduce the level and the profile of American forces without jeopardizing its military strategy. The Saudis will continue to need American backing, and the United States will continue to need their cooperation. The Persian Gulf region and its immense oil reserves will only become more important for the global economy in the future.
The security of the Persian Gulf will remain a vital Western interest for the foreseeable future. Therefore, planning for a major theater war (MTW) in the Persian Gulf particularly the ability to halt a large-scale invasion with short warning—will remain a cornerstone of U.S. defense planning. That said, winning big wars in the Persian Gulf will present more difficult challenges in the future. The United States’ most likely adversaries, for example, could threaten or resort to the early use of nuclear,
Biological or chemical (NBC) weapons. They may also employ other asymmetrical threats (e.g., terrorism or information warfare) to interfere with a Western military response. Under these circumstances, the infrastructure on which the United States relies to conduct military operations could be damaged, hampering the introduction and buildup of U.S. forces. In addition, the United States and its European allies could face political restrictions on their access
To regional bases. In this situation, it would be up to rapidly deployable air power to blunt the invasion before strategic targets in Kuwait and northern Saudi Arabia were seized. Accordingly, U.S. preparations to defeat large-scale aggression will be essential to sustaining deterrence, demonstrating U.S. security commitment to the Persian Gulf states, and maintaining U.S. predominance in a vital region. At the same time, however, the United States and its allies must be prepared to cope with a broader range of threats in the Persian Gulf. Because of the economic and military weaknesses of Iran, the danger of large-scale Iranian military attack against the Arab states in the Persian Gulf remains impossible and remote for at least the next five to ten years. Indeed, during this period country is likely to use other means to pursue regional hegemony and to end U.S. domination of the Persian Gulf. The two most likely options are (1) use of NBC weapons, terrorism, and subversion; and (2) limited air and missile attacks or small-scale ground incursions to achieve limited objectives (e.g., seizure of limited territory or assets) According to new US policy in Persian gulf, If America’s European allies are to make a significant contribution to Persian Gulf defense, they must be able to deploy forces to the region promptly and must operate out of a well-developed infrastructure. The most cost-effective means to improve allied rapid deployment capabilities is to pre-position heavy logistics support (e.g., ordnance and fuel) in theater that would otherwise require a large amount of lift to move. In addition, facilities in the Persian Gulf states are oriented to supporting the operational requirements of U.S. The United States should encourage the U.K. and France to substantially expand their forward prepositioning of munitions stocks and to work with appropriate Persian Gulf states to ensure that their facilities can provide the necessary support for deploying allied . In addition to the operational benefits that would result, an increased allied presence in the region would strengthen deterrence, sustain domestic support for U.S. deployments in the Persian Gulf, and perhaps allow the United States to draw down its own presence, thereby reducing the exposure of U.S. forces to acts of terrorism and political violence.
Sources:
Understanding the American Oil Strategy in the Persian Gulf region:
By Shibley Telhami
Persian Gulf Security: Improving Allied Military Contributions Summary
Richard Sokolsky, Stuart Johnson, and F. Stephen Larrabee
Persian Gulf Security: Improving Allied Military Contributions Richard Sokolsky, Stuart Johnson, and F. Stephen Larrabee
Understanding Iran’s Motivations in Iraq: The Cost Calculus of External Support
By Ryan Carr
The Big Lie: ‘Iran Is a Threat’, by Scott Ritter
Over the next 20 years, the portion of Western Europe’s total oil consumption imported from the Persian Gulf will increase to 35 percent, compared to 14 percent for the United States. By 2015, Persian Gulf exports will meet roughly half of all global oil consumption needs and will become the predominant source to which the Asia-Pacific region will turn to fill its burgeoning energy demands. Consequently, the perception is likely to arise that a serious interruption of Persian Gulf oil supplies would cause severe economic and financial dislocation as well as political and social instability in the developing world, and this in turn could generate pressure for Western military action.
In matters of oil, the Region. The Persian Gulf will remain the main source of Western energy supplies over the next decade . The Persian Gulf region has grabbed the greatest global attention during the past 50 years.
It will remain critical for future energy supplies. In a way, all the scrambling to develop resources around the world today is intended to delay the day of reckoning. Although the Persian Gulf produces a quarter of world oil supplies, it holds between two-thirds and three-quarters of all known oil reserves. For that reason the United States and the West have continued to define the region as being vitally important.
During this time, the US administration has seemingly vacillated between ratcheting up its aggressive rhetoric and offering a more conciliatory approach toward Iran. For instance, in March 2007, the U.S. Navy initiated a major exercise in the Persian Gulf designed to send a message to the Iranians, while reassuring “regional audiences” about the capabilities and determination of U.S. forces. The timetable for the exercise, which had been previously scheduled, was accelerated in part as a response to the Iran’s refusal to curtail its nuclear programs.
According to Shibley Telhami :This region is vitally important, however, does not automatically lead to the conclusion that a large military presence is required there—or to serious questions about the continued availability of this oil on the world market. This seeming revelation has recently provoked a debate in Washington, one focused especially on Saudi Arabia, which alone holds a quarter of the world's known oil reserves. Two central questions have been whether the United States needs to have a military presence in the region at all and whether our primary aim has been to defend Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states with whom we now discover we have serious policy disagreements. Moreover, many commentators, frustrated with the tension in relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia, have stepped up calls for weaning the United States of foreign oil broadly and of Persian Gulf oil in particular. But the debate entirely misses the logic of the American involvement.
First of all, buying oil from Persian Gulf region other than the Middle East will not resolve the problem. As the adage reminds us, "we are all sipping from the same cup." The oil market is seamless and is largely driven by supply and demand. Persian Gulf supplies affect the price of Persian Gulf oil, yes, but also the price of global oil. And while the United States can and should conserve energy and develop alternate energy sources, the gap between what the United States now produces and what it consumes (nearly 10 million barrels a day) is simply too wide to be bridged. Moreover, the clustering of the reserves in the Middle East also means that at some point in the not too distant future, a greater share of the oil supply will inescapably be coming from that region.
Nonetheless, it is not entirely clear why oil economics should be mixed with oil politics or what necessitates a military strategy at all. Indeed, many countries that depend heavily on Persian Gulf oil countries such as Japan and many countries in Europe—have assumed that they can base their policy entirely on the demands of the market without seeing a need for political and military intervention. This attitude may in part be driven by their taking the United States for granted and assuming that US will do the job to the benefit of all consumers. But there is more to it than that. Outside the United States the view is growing that assuring the flow of oil does not require a significant military strategy. This view is bolstered by historical trends. With the exception of the 1973 Arab oil embargo, which was politically motivated and which led to extraordinary increases in oil prices, long-term evidence suggests that the market, more than any other issue, determines trends in oil prices. Historically, political alliances have not greatly altered patterns of trade between the oil countries and the rest of the world. Oil producers sell oil to the countries that need it and are willing to pay the price and import the best products they can from the best sources they can find. The same was true even during the Cold War years, when political relationships were obviously not central to the oil producers' trading behavior. The bottom line was that these states did what was in their economic interest, regardless of their political orientation.
IRAN has never manifested itself as a serious threat to the national security of the United States, or by extension as a security threat to global security. At the height of Iran’s “exportation of the Islamic Revolution” phase, in the mid-1980’s, the Islamic Republic demonstrated a less-than-impressive ability to project its power beyond the immediate borders of Iran, and even then this projection was limited to war-torn Lebanon.
The situation the United States confronts in the Persian Gulf is therefore rich with irony: In the most challenging though unlikely scenario—large-scale of Iranian conventional attack—some allies will probably be willing to contribute to military operations to defend important Western interests. In the more likely but less serious contingencies, however, the United States will probably bear most or the entire military burden alone. Participation in the defense of the Persian Gulf
Will be a matter of choice rather than obligation for America’s European allies—and most are likely either to opt out or to commit only token forces.
After the 1991 Persian Gulf War, with momentum on the rise for deploying American forces and establishing what amounted to a new fleet in the Persian Gulf region, some observers believed that the increased American presence would give the United States a decided advantage over Europe and Japan in trade with the Persian Gulf states. In some instances, no doubt, Washington was able to use its political leverage to help American businesses win contracts in the region, especially in the military and aerospace arenas. But at the aggregate level, the trade figures between the region and the rest of the world show that the United States had no visible advantage. The year before Iraq invaded Kuwait(in 1989), The Figures show that European exports to the Middle East stood at $40.2 billion, as against $13.7 billion for the United States. The year after the Persian Gulf War(in 1992), Europe's export total was $57.2 billion, as against $19.9 billion for the United States. And the trend continued. In 2000, Europe shipped $63.7 billion of exports to the Middle East; the United States, $23.0 billion.
A wide gap currently separates U.S. and European perspectives and policies toward the Persian Gulf, notwithstanding their shared interest in secure oil supplies. NATO faces severe institutional limitations on a formal role in Persian Gulf defense, reflecting widespread apprehension on the part of European governments and publics about becoming entangled in security commitments and military operations outside Europe. Likewise, individual allied governments—with the exception of the U.K. and France—generally have little stomach for engaging in such operations outside the Alliance framework.
The reasons for these attitudes are not difficult to understand: many European governments do not share the United States’ view on the nature of Western interests in the region, the nature of the threats to those interests, and the most effective means of responding to such threats. In particular, many allied governments, believing that the United States has exaggerated the Iraqi
And Iranian military threat, prefer strategies of constructive “engagement” rather than “containment” to cope with the broader security challenges posed by these states. In addition, there is still a lingering fear in Europe that the United States will embroil European countries in conflicts that do not involve threats to their vital interests.
Maintaining the U.S. military presence in the Persian Gulf costs upward of $60 billion a year. Because these forces can also be used elsewhere, that sum is not entirely spent on defending the region. Still, one wonders why the United States devotes so much of its resources, energies, and war planning to the Persian Gulf. Would it not be more sensible to leave the oil issue to market forces and to leave politics out of it?
As conventionally understood, the American strategy is based on a resolve to assure the flow of oil to the West at reasonable prices—a resolve that extends to mitigating short-term interruptions in oil supply and subsequent spikes in pricing by relying on states, notably Saudi Arabia, that have excess capacity. (This alone requires Saudi-U.S. cooperation to assure that the Saudi capacity is used as a moderating force on the oil market.) But for more than half a century a central drive behind the American military strategy in the oil-rich region—one that has been not fully understood by most analysts—has been to deny the control of such vast resources to powerful enemies who would thereby become even more powerful and thus more threatening.
.Today, the prevailing perception in Washington is that Iran is aggressive (according to US department), dangerous country. Deterring its ability to encroach on Saudi oil fields—hence denying these states additional oil revenues—is one aim of the continuing American presence in the Persian Gulf region. The underlying concern is not just about possible disruptions in oil supplies, and ensuing price shocks, that the actions of hostile regimes could occasion. The larger issue, from the standpoint of the United States, is that if Iran were able to enrich them by taking control of additional oil reserves, this regime would soon become more menacing to the United States than already is, even if it were eager to sell to the rest of the world all the oil it seized.
The extent to which Iran is a threat will remain a matter of debate. Does it pose a threat to the United States? Or is the U.S. concern more for its Arab friends (sought of Persian Gulf Such as UAE, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and Saudi Arabia) in the region, especially Israel, for whom IRAN is potential threats?? It is hard to imagine the circumstances under which the current government in Iran will be seen as anything less than aggressive and threatening (according to US department). This outlook makes it likely that any American administration in the foreseeable future will continue to try to prevent IRAN from coming to control the bulk of the world's known oil reserves—independent of U.S. concern for friendly Arab governments in the Persian Gulf.
But whatever the reasoning behind the American military strategy (US policy on IRAN), it remains in the interest of the Persian Gulf Cooperation Council states to have American military backing. That gives the United States some leverage, but only up to a point since PGCC states know that the U.S. strategy also serves American interests. The result is clear mutual incentives to cooperate. Certainly, when threats to oil are clear, as in the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Saudi Arabia and other PGCC states will undoubtedly rally behind the United States to defend the oil fields. And even without imminent threat, PGCC states, especially Kuwait, have an interest in the U.S. presence in the region. U.S. forces are spread throughout much of the Persian Gulf, from prepositioned equipment in Qatar, to forces and equipment in Kuwait, to the naval facilities in Bahrain (former Iranian province until 1970,s. The Saudis, who also host American troops, have incentives to maintain an American presence in the Persian Gulf region even as they seek to lower the numbers and the profile of American forces on their own soil for fear of public backlash. But in the months since September 11, the American Saudis have discovered that their public perception of the illegitimacy of the presence on their soil is a threat to them as well as to that presence—just as the United States has discovered the depth of public resentment in the Persian gulf region. This will necessitate mutual cooperation. The Saudis will have to transmit to their public the sort of friendship with America that has existed at the governmental level, and the United States will need to work with them to reduce the level and the profile of American forces without jeopardizing its military strategy. The Saudis will continue to need American backing, and the United States will continue to need their cooperation. The Persian Gulf region and its immense oil reserves will only become more important for the global economy in the future.
The security of the Persian Gulf will remain a vital Western interest for the foreseeable future. Therefore, planning for a major theater war (MTW) in the Persian Gulf particularly the ability to halt a large-scale invasion with short warning—will remain a cornerstone of U.S. defense planning. That said, winning big wars in the Persian Gulf will present more difficult challenges in the future. The United States’ most likely adversaries, for example, could threaten or resort to the early use of nuclear,
Biological or chemical (NBC) weapons. They may also employ other asymmetrical threats (e.g., terrorism or information warfare) to interfere with a Western military response. Under these circumstances, the infrastructure on which the United States relies to conduct military operations could be damaged, hampering the introduction and buildup of U.S. forces. In addition, the United States and its European allies could face political restrictions on their access
To regional bases. In this situation, it would be up to rapidly deployable air power to blunt the invasion before strategic targets in Kuwait and northern Saudi Arabia were seized. Accordingly, U.S. preparations to defeat large-scale aggression will be essential to sustaining deterrence, demonstrating U.S. security commitment to the Persian Gulf states, and maintaining U.S. predominance in a vital region. At the same time, however, the United States and its allies must be prepared to cope with a broader range of threats in the Persian Gulf. Because of the economic and military weaknesses of Iran, the danger of large-scale Iranian military attack against the Arab states in the Persian Gulf remains impossible and remote for at least the next five to ten years. Indeed, during this period country is likely to use other means to pursue regional hegemony and to end U.S. domination of the Persian Gulf. The two most likely options are (1) use of NBC weapons, terrorism, and subversion; and (2) limited air and missile attacks or small-scale ground incursions to achieve limited objectives (e.g., seizure of limited territory or assets) According to new US policy in Persian gulf, If America’s European allies are to make a significant contribution to Persian Gulf defense, they must be able to deploy forces to the region promptly and must operate out of a well-developed infrastructure. The most cost-effective means to improve allied rapid deployment capabilities is to pre-position heavy logistics support (e.g., ordnance and fuel) in theater that would otherwise require a large amount of lift to move. In addition, facilities in the Persian Gulf states are oriented to supporting the operational requirements of U.S. The United States should encourage the U.K. and France to substantially expand their forward prepositioning of munitions stocks and to work with appropriate Persian Gulf states to ensure that their facilities can provide the necessary support for deploying allied . In addition to the operational benefits that would result, an increased allied presence in the region would strengthen deterrence, sustain domestic support for U.S. deployments in the Persian Gulf, and perhaps allow the United States to draw down its own presence, thereby reducing the exposure of U.S. forces to acts of terrorism and political violence.
Sources:
Understanding the American Oil Strategy in the Persian Gulf region:
By Shibley Telhami
Persian Gulf Security: Improving Allied Military Contributions Summary
Richard Sokolsky, Stuart Johnson, and F. Stephen Larrabee
Persian Gulf Security: Improving Allied Military Contributions Richard Sokolsky, Stuart Johnson, and F. Stephen Larrabee
Understanding Iran’s Motivations in Iraq: The Cost Calculus of External Support
By Ryan Carr
The Big Lie: ‘Iran Is a Threat’, by Scott Ritter
Unveiling new master plan for the persian gulf
Morteza Aminmansour
Unveiling New Master plan for Persian gulf:
History with the United States: Surrounded by the greatest oil reserves on Earth, the Persian Gulf has long been a vitally important part of the global economy. The British controlled much of the region during the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries. American interest (and military presence) in and around the gulf has increased steadily since the oil crisis of the 1970s. Maintaining good relations with the countries surrounding the Persian gulf is a mainstay of U.S. foreign policy. When this isn't possible, the United States has attempted to change governments (as with Iraq) or isolate governments.
The major players in Persian Gulf include Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. (The Persian Gulf States including Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have a population of only 10 million, but their GNP exceeds any of the Arab states ) It has been an American objective since WWII to have regional hegemony in the Persian Gulf.
These three major players plus the Persian Gulf States hold a major part of the world’s oil reserve that is exported to the West as well as of natural gas deposits. Iraq’s western border include Syria, Jordan and Turkey. Iran’s eastern borders include Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as other central Asian countries. As a result the geopolitics of the Persian Gulf cannot be easily separated from the geopolitics of the Mid East.
Some in the Persian gulf region have tried to move beyond an oil-dominated economy. Qatar , site of a major American air base,. UAE also home to an American military base, has become a global leader in construction and media. Six countries around the Persian gulf (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia , Qatar, UAE, Oman and Bahrain) formed an alliance of sorts called the Persian Gulf cooperation council..
The idea for the United States to establish a formal defense alliance with the PGCC states and a new government of Iraq. To keep the Americans in forever, the Iranians out, and the Iraqis down but it did not work as expected. A formal defense pledge would be the best way to lock in an unflinching American commitment to the security of the region; would serve as the best deterrent by extending a security guarantee to Iraq, would effectively solve Baghdad's security dilemma as well, if Persian Gulf publics could be convinced that American forces were there as part of a community of equals, such an arrangement might also help legitimize the U.S. presence in the Persian gulf region.
Addressing systemic changes in the Persian gulf security environment since the Iraq War, prominent experts analyze the challenges these changes pose to U.S. strategy and policy. They examine the causes of profound economic, political and religious transitions and their implications for hopes of reform. Also examined are such long-term processes as population growth, environmental degradation, and educational failures.
The PCCC Gulf Project will convene a group of experts from academia and government to examine the current U.S. security strategy in the Persian Gulf. These experts will consider whether this strategy should be adjusted to reflect new threats and the evolution of the regional security environment over the last ten years.
At the end of the Persian Gulf War, the United States constructed a regional security architecture in the Persian Gulf designed to preserve stability and protect its long-range strategic interests in the area. The principal elements in this architecture are:
Ensuring access to host nation facilities for ongoing operations and contingencies through bilateral agreements.
Propositioning military equipment.
Building host nation self-defense capabilities through foreign military sales, training, and joint military exercises.
A continuously forward-deployed U.S. military presence.
This approach has proven remarkably successful in ensuring regional peace and security stability in the Persian Gulf during the last decade(according to James Russell). The last ten years has seen the United States nurture and build healthy bilateral political and military relationships throughout the Persian Gulf and, in parallel, it has developed a physical infrastructure for U.S. forces to fall in upon on short notice to defend the region. Iraq's conventional military forces have been effectively emasculated by the largely U.S.-enforced UN trade embargo, minimizing Saddam's ability to coerce and intimidate the smaller states in the region. And, Iran's objective of pursing regional hegemony has also largely been thwarted . While efforts to build host nation defensive capabilities are mixed, the United States is arguably better positioned now than at any time in recent memory to defend the region as a result of the strategy outlined above.
Given these conundrums, finding a workable new security architecture for the Persian Gulf will be far from easy. Iran must be kept in check while being pushed to liberalize its politics toward United States. The Corrupt governments of the PGCC states (UAE,BAHRAIN,QATAR, SAUDI ARABIA) must be given breathing room to reform but still be protected from their external(virtual enemy such as IRAN) and internal enemies(own people). Balancing these various interests, threats, and constraints will be difficult, so much so that it would not be surprising if the next American strategy for doing so ultimately failed, just as the previous ones did. Still, the situation is not entirely hopeless. There may not be a silver bullet, a perfect policy that secures every interest and counters every threat while avoiding all the strategic, political, and cultural minefields. But three broad approaches -- pulling back "over the horizon," trying to form a local NATO-like defense pact, or trying to establish a security condominium -- have enough merits to be considered seriously (according to M. Pollock).
In the Persian Gulf, such a security condominium would entail a similar set of activities bringing together the United States, the PGCC countries, Iraq, and Iran. The process would begin by establishing a regional security forum at which relevant issues could be debated and discussed, information exchanged, and agreements framed. The members could then move on to confidence-building measures, such as notification of exercises, exchanges of observers, and information swaps. Ultimately, the intention would be to proceed to eventual arms control agreements that might include demilitarized zones, bans on destabilizing weapons systems, and balanced force reductions for all parties. In particular, the group might aim for a ban on all WMD, complete with penalties for violators and a multilateral (or international) inspection program to enforce compliance
A timely and readable compendium of informed expertise; bridging the divide of internal and external security; addressing the sources of Persian gulf insecurity from the interdisciplinary perspectives of economics, politics, history, international relations and religion. To cope with such a variegated security environment the sources of potential instability and conflict are broken into their constituent parts.. Will the current security architecture continue to protect U.S. interests in the region over the next decade and beyond? The PCCC proposes to convene a group of government and non-government experts to review current US strategy in the Persian Gulf in the context of the emerging virtual threat environment. PCCC will frame a series of questions and issues to guide these experts in examining different aspects of US –Persian Gulf strategy and to make judgments about whether this strategy will protect US interests in the new century. For purposes of organizing the project, There are three proposals:
An examination of these issues from a U.S. perspective without the Persian gulf countries participation.
An examination of how the Persian Gulf would view the same issues.
A concluding section containing recommendations for U.S. policy makers based on the analysis in the first two sections.
Last, but not least, the three-way confrontation between the United States, Iran and Israel over Iran’s refusal to honor its commitments as a Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty signatory hangs like the sword of Damocles over the region. Iran reopened its uranium enrichment facility at Natanz on January 10, 2006, had the International Atomic Energy Agency remove seals and surveillance system on other nuclear facilities in mid-February.
strategy and the role that the Saudis might play in a broader regional framework. The Persian Gulf and Middle East have related forces. First came the September 11attacks and the unwelcome (at least from the Saudi perspective) attention in the American press to alleged Saudi financial support for al-Qaeda in conjunction with stories of Saudi sponsorship of religious extremism through the funding of madrasas in Pakistan and elsewhere preaching a “Wahhabi” fundamentalist version of Islam to receptive Muslim audiences around the world. The situation seemed particularly acute in Pakistan, where Saudi financial support for the madrasas and the jihadists during the war in Afghanistan morphed into the Taliban, which eventually took over Afghanistan and provided al-Qaeda with a geographic base to build an infrastructure to support terrorist operations around the world.5 While the press and public justifiably focused on the fact that 15 out of the 19 attackers on 9/11 came from Saudi Arabia, this alone might not have been so serious but for the wider context of U.S.- Saudi relations. There had been a decade of drift in the U.S.-Saudi security relationship, highlighted by the obvious discomfort of the House of Saud with the continuing presence of U.S. forces operating out of Prince Sultan Air Base. With the presence of these forces seized upon for criticism by emerging domestic political forces in the kingdom, the House of Saud found it could no longer quietly conduct business with the
Americans out of the public view. Moreover, despite various critics pointing to an
alleged cozy relationship between the Bush family and the House of Saud, it seemed
unclear after 9/11 whether the Bush administration was prepared to continue
“business as usual.” These strains converged to undermine the U.S.-Saudi
relationship; just how seriously remains to be seen
Most Middle East experts think that a revolution or civil war in any of the PGCC states within the next few years is unlikely, but few say so now as confidently as they once did. In fact, even the Persian Gulf regimes themselves are increasingly fearful of their mounting internal turmoil, something that has prompted all of them to announce democratic and economic reform packages at some point during the last ten years. From Corrupt Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia to the unpopular emir of Qatar to the new puppet king of Bahrain, the Persian Gulf rulers recognize the pressure building among their populations and the need to let off some of the steam. If the reforms do not succeed and revolution or civil war ensues, the United States might face some very difficult security challenges. Widespread unrest in Saudi Arabia, for example, would threaten Saudi oil exports .
Growing Saudi concern over its security dilemma can be detected in the smoke wafting around this issue. It started appearing in the fall of 2003, with further hints throughout the winter and spring of 2004. Following the September 18, 2003, story in The Guardian on the options under consideration to ensure Saudi security, the London-based Saudi daily Al-Sharq al- Awsat published an editorial on October 8titled “Yes, We Fear Iran’s Uranium.” The editorial, penned by editor Abd Al-Rahman Al-Rashad, dismissed the idea that the Iranian nuclear program was directed at threats from the United States and Israel:
According to James Russell: The Iranians are enriching uranium to produce nuclear weapons!!! aimed, essentially, at its neighbors, mainly Pakistan. However, the danger encompasses the other neighboring countries as well, such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. The editorial further opined, Commitment conveyed to the House of Saud on a number of occasions in the post-World War II era – and would use force and/or deploy forces to the kingdom if necessary on those occasions when the House of Saud and the U.S. political leadership agreed that the situation warranted;• The United States would seek to develop Saudi internal and external security capabilities through the sale of defense equipment and training supported by the presence of advisory elements to help manage the complicated programs and day-to-day training activities;• The Saudis would use their influence as the dominant supplier within OPEC and world oil markets to ensure that crude reached the market in a relatively predictable stream; The Saudis would generally support U.S. interests in the region, such as the Middle East peace process, though it would not take the lead publicly in supporting these interests; The United States would not push substantial internal political or economy reform, leaving the House of Saud to fulfill its part of the tacit bargain. While Saudi Arabia remains a constructive The House of Saud eventually must address the contradictions between its partnership with the United States and the arguments for ending the relationship being advanced by a powerful domestic political constituency that has been a central pillar of the regime’s governing structure. The confluence of positions between the dissident clerics and the religious establishment restricts the House of Saud’s bargaining power on domestic and international issues, since the regime’s legitimacy stems from its historic pledge to uphold the conservative tenets of Wahhabi Islam in coordination with the religious establishment. The shrinking domestic political maneuvering room may help explain the caution in placing new military orders with the United States. There have been major arms sales after the 1997 purchase of the F-15I fighter aircraft. The eroded U.S.-Saudi political partnership cannot but lead to the re-emergence of the doubts frequently voiced by the Saudi leadership during the early 1980s about the reliability of the United States as a supplier of advanced weaponry.
An approach to securing the Persian Gulf would be to create a new regional defense alliance of the kind that worked so well in Europe during the Cold War. This approach has an even worse reputation in the region than offshore balancing, but it is somewhat undeserved. In 1954, the United States convinced Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom to sign the Baghdad Pact, pledging them to mutual defense. Four years later, Iraq withdrew, leaving Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey to form the Central Treaty Organization, which became little more than a vehicle for the United States to arm the shah of Iran for the next 20 years. These alliances performed poorly because their members had widely divergent security problems (Pakistan was concerned with India, Turkey with Russia and Greece, and Iran with the Middle East) and because of the revolutions in Iraq in 1958 and Iran in 1979, which knocked out the central players. In today's circumstances, a regional alliance would stand a better chance of succeeding.
The Persian Gulf ( Foreign Policy: US From Keith Porter),SAUDI ARABIA IN THE 21ST CENTURY: A NEW
SECURITY DILEMMA
James A. Russell
--Glen M. Segell, FRGS, Director, Institute of Security Policy
James Russell Department of National Security AffairsNaval Postgraduate School Securing the GulfBy Kenneth M. Pollack From Foreign Affairs, July/August 2003
THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE PERSIAN GULF: Rabbi Moshe Reiss
Unveiling New Master plan for Persian gulf:
History with the United States: Surrounded by the greatest oil reserves on Earth, the Persian Gulf has long been a vitally important part of the global economy. The British controlled much of the region during the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries. American interest (and military presence) in and around the gulf has increased steadily since the oil crisis of the 1970s. Maintaining good relations with the countries surrounding the Persian gulf is a mainstay of U.S. foreign policy. When this isn't possible, the United States has attempted to change governments (as with Iraq) or isolate governments.
The major players in Persian Gulf include Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. (The Persian Gulf States including Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates have a population of only 10 million, but their GNP exceeds any of the Arab states ) It has been an American objective since WWII to have regional hegemony in the Persian Gulf.
These three major players plus the Persian Gulf States hold a major part of the world’s oil reserve that is exported to the West as well as of natural gas deposits. Iraq’s western border include Syria, Jordan and Turkey. Iran’s eastern borders include Afghanistan and Pakistan as well as other central Asian countries. As a result the geopolitics of the Persian Gulf cannot be easily separated from the geopolitics of the Mid East.
Some in the Persian gulf region have tried to move beyond an oil-dominated economy. Qatar , site of a major American air base,. UAE also home to an American military base, has become a global leader in construction and media. Six countries around the Persian gulf (Kuwait, Saudi Arabia , Qatar, UAE, Oman and Bahrain) formed an alliance of sorts called the Persian Gulf cooperation council..
The idea for the United States to establish a formal defense alliance with the PGCC states and a new government of Iraq. To keep the Americans in forever, the Iranians out, and the Iraqis down but it did not work as expected. A formal defense pledge would be the best way to lock in an unflinching American commitment to the security of the region; would serve as the best deterrent by extending a security guarantee to Iraq, would effectively solve Baghdad's security dilemma as well, if Persian Gulf publics could be convinced that American forces were there as part of a community of equals, such an arrangement might also help legitimize the U.S. presence in the Persian gulf region.
Addressing systemic changes in the Persian gulf security environment since the Iraq War, prominent experts analyze the challenges these changes pose to U.S. strategy and policy. They examine the causes of profound economic, political and religious transitions and their implications for hopes of reform. Also examined are such long-term processes as population growth, environmental degradation, and educational failures.
The PCCC Gulf Project will convene a group of experts from academia and government to examine the current U.S. security strategy in the Persian Gulf. These experts will consider whether this strategy should be adjusted to reflect new threats and the evolution of the regional security environment over the last ten years.
At the end of the Persian Gulf War, the United States constructed a regional security architecture in the Persian Gulf designed to preserve stability and protect its long-range strategic interests in the area. The principal elements in this architecture are:
Ensuring access to host nation facilities for ongoing operations and contingencies through bilateral agreements.
Propositioning military equipment.
Building host nation self-defense capabilities through foreign military sales, training, and joint military exercises.
A continuously forward-deployed U.S. military presence.
This approach has proven remarkably successful in ensuring regional peace and security stability in the Persian Gulf during the last decade(according to James Russell). The last ten years has seen the United States nurture and build healthy bilateral political and military relationships throughout the Persian Gulf and, in parallel, it has developed a physical infrastructure for U.S. forces to fall in upon on short notice to defend the region. Iraq's conventional military forces have been effectively emasculated by the largely U.S.-enforced UN trade embargo, minimizing Saddam's ability to coerce and intimidate the smaller states in the region. And, Iran's objective of pursing regional hegemony has also largely been thwarted . While efforts to build host nation defensive capabilities are mixed, the United States is arguably better positioned now than at any time in recent memory to defend the region as a result of the strategy outlined above.
Given these conundrums, finding a workable new security architecture for the Persian Gulf will be far from easy. Iran must be kept in check while being pushed to liberalize its politics toward United States. The Corrupt governments of the PGCC states (UAE,BAHRAIN,QATAR, SAUDI ARABIA) must be given breathing room to reform but still be protected from their external(virtual enemy such as IRAN) and internal enemies(own people). Balancing these various interests, threats, and constraints will be difficult, so much so that it would not be surprising if the next American strategy for doing so ultimately failed, just as the previous ones did. Still, the situation is not entirely hopeless. There may not be a silver bullet, a perfect policy that secures every interest and counters every threat while avoiding all the strategic, political, and cultural minefields. But three broad approaches -- pulling back "over the horizon," trying to form a local NATO-like defense pact, or trying to establish a security condominium -- have enough merits to be considered seriously (according to M. Pollock).
In the Persian Gulf, such a security condominium would entail a similar set of activities bringing together the United States, the PGCC countries, Iraq, and Iran. The process would begin by establishing a regional security forum at which relevant issues could be debated and discussed, information exchanged, and agreements framed. The members could then move on to confidence-building measures, such as notification of exercises, exchanges of observers, and information swaps. Ultimately, the intention would be to proceed to eventual arms control agreements that might include demilitarized zones, bans on destabilizing weapons systems, and balanced force reductions for all parties. In particular, the group might aim for a ban on all WMD, complete with penalties for violators and a multilateral (or international) inspection program to enforce compliance
A timely and readable compendium of informed expertise; bridging the divide of internal and external security; addressing the sources of Persian gulf insecurity from the interdisciplinary perspectives of economics, politics, history, international relations and religion. To cope with such a variegated security environment the sources of potential instability and conflict are broken into their constituent parts.. Will the current security architecture continue to protect U.S. interests in the region over the next decade and beyond? The PCCC proposes to convene a group of government and non-government experts to review current US strategy in the Persian Gulf in the context of the emerging virtual threat environment. PCCC will frame a series of questions and issues to guide these experts in examining different aspects of US –Persian Gulf strategy and to make judgments about whether this strategy will protect US interests in the new century. For purposes of organizing the project, There are three proposals:
An examination of these issues from a U.S. perspective without the Persian gulf countries participation.
An examination of how the Persian Gulf would view the same issues.
A concluding section containing recommendations for U.S. policy makers based on the analysis in the first two sections.
Last, but not least, the three-way confrontation between the United States, Iran and Israel over Iran’s refusal to honor its commitments as a Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty signatory hangs like the sword of Damocles over the region. Iran reopened its uranium enrichment facility at Natanz on January 10, 2006, had the International Atomic Energy Agency remove seals and surveillance system on other nuclear facilities in mid-February.
strategy and the role that the Saudis might play in a broader regional framework. The Persian Gulf and Middle East have related forces. First came the September 11attacks and the unwelcome (at least from the Saudi perspective) attention in the American press to alleged Saudi financial support for al-Qaeda in conjunction with stories of Saudi sponsorship of religious extremism through the funding of madrasas in Pakistan and elsewhere preaching a “Wahhabi” fundamentalist version of Islam to receptive Muslim audiences around the world. The situation seemed particularly acute in Pakistan, where Saudi financial support for the madrasas and the jihadists during the war in Afghanistan morphed into the Taliban, which eventually took over Afghanistan and provided al-Qaeda with a geographic base to build an infrastructure to support terrorist operations around the world.5 While the press and public justifiably focused on the fact that 15 out of the 19 attackers on 9/11 came from Saudi Arabia, this alone might not have been so serious but for the wider context of U.S.- Saudi relations. There had been a decade of drift in the U.S.-Saudi security relationship, highlighted by the obvious discomfort of the House of Saud with the continuing presence of U.S. forces operating out of Prince Sultan Air Base. With the presence of these forces seized upon for criticism by emerging domestic political forces in the kingdom, the House of Saud found it could no longer quietly conduct business with the
Americans out of the public view. Moreover, despite various critics pointing to an
alleged cozy relationship between the Bush family and the House of Saud, it seemed
unclear after 9/11 whether the Bush administration was prepared to continue
“business as usual.” These strains converged to undermine the U.S.-Saudi
relationship; just how seriously remains to be seen
Most Middle East experts think that a revolution or civil war in any of the PGCC states within the next few years is unlikely, but few say so now as confidently as they once did. In fact, even the Persian Gulf regimes themselves are increasingly fearful of their mounting internal turmoil, something that has prompted all of them to announce democratic and economic reform packages at some point during the last ten years. From Corrupt Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia to the unpopular emir of Qatar to the new puppet king of Bahrain, the Persian Gulf rulers recognize the pressure building among their populations and the need to let off some of the steam. If the reforms do not succeed and revolution or civil war ensues, the United States might face some very difficult security challenges. Widespread unrest in Saudi Arabia, for example, would threaten Saudi oil exports .
Growing Saudi concern over its security dilemma can be detected in the smoke wafting around this issue. It started appearing in the fall of 2003, with further hints throughout the winter and spring of 2004. Following the September 18, 2003, story in The Guardian on the options under consideration to ensure Saudi security, the London-based Saudi daily Al-Sharq al- Awsat published an editorial on October 8titled “Yes, We Fear Iran’s Uranium.” The editorial, penned by editor Abd Al-Rahman Al-Rashad, dismissed the idea that the Iranian nuclear program was directed at threats from the United States and Israel:
According to James Russell: The Iranians are enriching uranium to produce nuclear weapons!!! aimed, essentially, at its neighbors, mainly Pakistan. However, the danger encompasses the other neighboring countries as well, such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, Iraq, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan. The editorial further opined, Commitment conveyed to the House of Saud on a number of occasions in the post-World War II era – and would use force and/or deploy forces to the kingdom if necessary on those occasions when the House of Saud and the U.S. political leadership agreed that the situation warranted;• The United States would seek to develop Saudi internal and external security capabilities through the sale of defense equipment and training supported by the presence of advisory elements to help manage the complicated programs and day-to-day training activities;• The Saudis would use their influence as the dominant supplier within OPEC and world oil markets to ensure that crude reached the market in a relatively predictable stream; The Saudis would generally support U.S. interests in the region, such as the Middle East peace process, though it would not take the lead publicly in supporting these interests; The United States would not push substantial internal political or economy reform, leaving the House of Saud to fulfill its part of the tacit bargain. While Saudi Arabia remains a constructive The House of Saud eventually must address the contradictions between its partnership with the United States and the arguments for ending the relationship being advanced by a powerful domestic political constituency that has been a central pillar of the regime’s governing structure. The confluence of positions between the dissident clerics and the religious establishment restricts the House of Saud’s bargaining power on domestic and international issues, since the regime’s legitimacy stems from its historic pledge to uphold the conservative tenets of Wahhabi Islam in coordination with the religious establishment. The shrinking domestic political maneuvering room may help explain the caution in placing new military orders with the United States. There have been major arms sales after the 1997 purchase of the F-15I fighter aircraft. The eroded U.S.-Saudi political partnership cannot but lead to the re-emergence of the doubts frequently voiced by the Saudi leadership during the early 1980s about the reliability of the United States as a supplier of advanced weaponry.
An approach to securing the Persian Gulf would be to create a new regional defense alliance of the kind that worked so well in Europe during the Cold War. This approach has an even worse reputation in the region than offshore balancing, but it is somewhat undeserved. In 1954, the United States convinced Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and the United Kingdom to sign the Baghdad Pact, pledging them to mutual defense. Four years later, Iraq withdrew, leaving Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey to form the Central Treaty Organization, which became little more than a vehicle for the United States to arm the shah of Iran for the next 20 years. These alliances performed poorly because their members had widely divergent security problems (Pakistan was concerned with India, Turkey with Russia and Greece, and Iran with the Middle East) and because of the revolutions in Iraq in 1958 and Iran in 1979, which knocked out the central players. In today's circumstances, a regional alliance would stand a better chance of succeeding.
The Persian Gulf ( Foreign Policy: US From Keith Porter),SAUDI ARABIA IN THE 21ST CENTURY: A NEW
SECURITY DILEMMA
James A. Russell
--Glen M. Segell, FRGS, Director, Institute of Security Policy
James Russell Department of National Security AffairsNaval Postgraduate School Securing the GulfBy Kenneth M. Pollack From Foreign Affairs, July/August 2003
THE GEOPOLITICS OF THE PERSIAN GULF: Rabbi Moshe Reiss
Us and Reshaping its politics in the persian gulf
US and Reshaping its Policies in the Persian Gulf -By Morteza Aminmansour Morteza Aminmansour moryamin@yahoo.com ---------------------------------
After failing in it’s attempt to implement it’s new Middle East initiative, the White House felt compelled to change it’s strategy and began fomenting conflicts in the Persian Gulf region. It is obvious that an arms buildup by the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf could also threaten Iran's national security, because the U.S. would surely try to provoke them to act against Iran's interests in the future.
In addition, such an arms buildup would allow the United States to send more military experts to the Persian Gulf region under the pretext of training Arab armies.
Saudi Arabia and other regional Arab countries will definitely face internal challenges because of their cultural backwardness and their refusal to democratize, but no foreign power is going to threaten them. The purchase of U.S. weapons by Arab countries sought by the Persian Gulf will certainly foster distrust between the countries on both sides of the Persian Gulf, and may also undermine their economic development, but will not guarantee the security of these undemocratic regimes such as UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia.
The actual winners of this game will be western countries including the U.S. military-industrial complex, which takes advantage of the situation between Islamic countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. And the losers will be the people of these countries. Seeing as Iran is a home to 75 million people, it is unrealistic to expect that western countries can exclude Iran from any conceptions of Middle East security in the future. But the Western countries have already recognized that as long as the United States dominates the region and Iran seeks to undermine this dominance, other Persian Gulf States and external global powers such as China, Britain, Germany, Japan, and France with a stake in the region would be reduced to a status as "friends" or "enemies" of one another. The Persian Gulf States need to put more trust in their relationship with Iran as a peaceful alternative, and need to realize the strategic commonalities between their states. Unfortunately, the current US-British strategic framework leads to the presumption that Iran is a threat that requires the counterbalancing force of the United States, and a situation in which "each side believes that the other is the locus of the security deficit in the region."
Many argued that the "natural geographic proximity driving Iranian concerns" makes the United States’ interference in destabilization of Iraq seem hypocritical. Some nationalistic Iranians are not thinking about Iraq however, but instead are focusing on U.S. involvement in the region and how to teach a lesson to those in Iraq. As a matter a fact, if Iraq is destabilized and the U.S. pull out, certain civil war would most likely happen and it will destroy Iran's chances at building bilateral economic ties with Iraq and other Arab countries sought of the Persian Gulf, and that could potentially spark internal problems with it’s own people.
There is very important ground questioning concerning if the establishment of the Shia government in Iraq is important for Iran's strategic goals, and it might be considered just one step in decreasing U.S. involvement in this region. It is unrealistic to believe that it is in Iran's best interests to see Iraq descend into a bloody civil war. External powers such as the European Union, Japan, and China expressed a desire to see a better equitable and balanced U.S. leadership role in the region. Within this security framework, major outside powers (Germany, France, Britain, Japan, and China) would feel more comfortable investing in trade and new energy projects, whereas the Persian Gulf Arab states could comfortably negotiate with both the United States and Iran and all of the other countries that they could provide aid for domestic political developments in the region.
It has to be recognized that the United States will always have an interest in the security of the Persian Gulf. A subtle shift towards bilateral negotiations and more cooperative action could reap enormous economic and socio-political benefits for the region including its enemy, Iran. Some assessments are that the United States will need to adopt a more comprehensive approach to the region’s problems while advancing such other regional goals as a secure access to cheaper oil.
The United States is trying to reconfigure and reshape its security and military relationships with regional friends and allies in the Persian Gulf to take account of their changing security perceptions and policies.
In the last decade, the overriding U.S. concern was preserving access to the Persian Gulf oil at reasonable prices, despite its internal political problems at home, Iran possessed only a limited ability to dominate its power and influence beyond their borders; the Persian Gulf states acquiesced to a significant U.S. military presence on their soil, despite the domestic costs, and the United States was reasonably successful.
Besides all these arguments, there were grounds for questioning whether shifting more of the political and military burdens of supporting U.S. military strategy to the smaller Persian Gulf states (Bahrain, UAE, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar) was sustainable over the long haul, and if it could inflame the tension between these two countries, the USA and Iran over dominating the power in this region.
The most comprehensive vision by Iran on the issue of Persian Gulf security includes: Preparing common security grounds for fighting terrorism, organized crime and drug smuggling, as well as other joint security concerns.
Gradual removal of all restrictions in political, security, economic and cultural fields. Development of trade ties by taking the countries' potentials into consideration and conducting joint investment in economic projects to achieve a regional free-trade mechanism.
Guaranteeing the security and energy export of regional countries to secure their interests and achieving a sustainable mechanism for energy needed by the world. Making foreign military personnel exit the region and establishing full security by the regional countries.
Unfortunately, there is only a dim prospect for this proposal's acceptance by the Arab states of the PGCC, which have devised their own version of "collective security" that does not include the region's two most populous states, Iran and Iraq, and which have traditionally relied on US protectorate power. The PGCC comprises Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
------------ Source: United press international Finding Persian Gulf Security Alternatives by Katherine Gypson Iran unveils a Persian Gulf security plan By Kaveh L Afrasiabi Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University
After failing in it’s attempt to implement it’s new Middle East initiative, the White House felt compelled to change it’s strategy and began fomenting conflicts in the Persian Gulf region. It is obvious that an arms buildup by the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf could also threaten Iran's national security, because the U.S. would surely try to provoke them to act against Iran's interests in the future.
In addition, such an arms buildup would allow the United States to send more military experts to the Persian Gulf region under the pretext of training Arab armies.
Saudi Arabia and other regional Arab countries will definitely face internal challenges because of their cultural backwardness and their refusal to democratize, but no foreign power is going to threaten them. The purchase of U.S. weapons by Arab countries sought by the Persian Gulf will certainly foster distrust between the countries on both sides of the Persian Gulf, and may also undermine their economic development, but will not guarantee the security of these undemocratic regimes such as UAE, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia.
The actual winners of this game will be western countries including the U.S. military-industrial complex, which takes advantage of the situation between Islamic countries such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. And the losers will be the people of these countries. Seeing as Iran is a home to 75 million people, it is unrealistic to expect that western countries can exclude Iran from any conceptions of Middle East security in the future. But the Western countries have already recognized that as long as the United States dominates the region and Iran seeks to undermine this dominance, other Persian Gulf States and external global powers such as China, Britain, Germany, Japan, and France with a stake in the region would be reduced to a status as "friends" or "enemies" of one another. The Persian Gulf States need to put more trust in their relationship with Iran as a peaceful alternative, and need to realize the strategic commonalities between their states. Unfortunately, the current US-British strategic framework leads to the presumption that Iran is a threat that requires the counterbalancing force of the United States, and a situation in which "each side believes that the other is the locus of the security deficit in the region."
Many argued that the "natural geographic proximity driving Iranian concerns" makes the United States’ interference in destabilization of Iraq seem hypocritical. Some nationalistic Iranians are not thinking about Iraq however, but instead are focusing on U.S. involvement in the region and how to teach a lesson to those in Iraq. As a matter a fact, if Iraq is destabilized and the U.S. pull out, certain civil war would most likely happen and it will destroy Iran's chances at building bilateral economic ties with Iraq and other Arab countries sought of the Persian Gulf, and that could potentially spark internal problems with it’s own people.
There is very important ground questioning concerning if the establishment of the Shia government in Iraq is important for Iran's strategic goals, and it might be considered just one step in decreasing U.S. involvement in this region. It is unrealistic to believe that it is in Iran's best interests to see Iraq descend into a bloody civil war. External powers such as the European Union, Japan, and China expressed a desire to see a better equitable and balanced U.S. leadership role in the region. Within this security framework, major outside powers (Germany, France, Britain, Japan, and China) would feel more comfortable investing in trade and new energy projects, whereas the Persian Gulf Arab states could comfortably negotiate with both the United States and Iran and all of the other countries that they could provide aid for domestic political developments in the region.
It has to be recognized that the United States will always have an interest in the security of the Persian Gulf. A subtle shift towards bilateral negotiations and more cooperative action could reap enormous economic and socio-political benefits for the region including its enemy, Iran. Some assessments are that the United States will need to adopt a more comprehensive approach to the region’s problems while advancing such other regional goals as a secure access to cheaper oil.
The United States is trying to reconfigure and reshape its security and military relationships with regional friends and allies in the Persian Gulf to take account of their changing security perceptions and policies.
In the last decade, the overriding U.S. concern was preserving access to the Persian Gulf oil at reasonable prices, despite its internal political problems at home, Iran possessed only a limited ability to dominate its power and influence beyond their borders; the Persian Gulf states acquiesced to a significant U.S. military presence on their soil, despite the domestic costs, and the United States was reasonably successful.
Besides all these arguments, there were grounds for questioning whether shifting more of the political and military burdens of supporting U.S. military strategy to the smaller Persian Gulf states (Bahrain, UAE, Kuwait, Oman, and Qatar) was sustainable over the long haul, and if it could inflame the tension between these two countries, the USA and Iran over dominating the power in this region.
The most comprehensive vision by Iran on the issue of Persian Gulf security includes: Preparing common security grounds for fighting terrorism, organized crime and drug smuggling, as well as other joint security concerns.
Gradual removal of all restrictions in political, security, economic and cultural fields. Development of trade ties by taking the countries' potentials into consideration and conducting joint investment in economic projects to achieve a regional free-trade mechanism.
Guaranteeing the security and energy export of regional countries to secure their interests and achieving a sustainable mechanism for energy needed by the world. Making foreign military personnel exit the region and establishing full security by the regional countries.
Unfortunately, there is only a dim prospect for this proposal's acceptance by the Arab states of the PGCC, which have devised their own version of "collective security" that does not include the region's two most populous states, Iran and Iraq, and which have traditionally relied on US protectorate power. The PGCC comprises Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
------------ Source: United press international Finding Persian Gulf Security Alternatives by Katherine Gypson Iran unveils a Persian Gulf security plan By Kaveh L Afrasiabi Institute for National Strategic Studies National Defense University
Urban Agglomeration Economies in Iran and other persian gulf countries
By: Morteza Aminmansour
Urban Agglomeration Economies in IRAN and other Persian Gulf Countries
In the study of human settlements, an agglomeration is an extended city or town area, comprising of a built-up area of a central place (usually a municipality) and any suburbs (the usually residential region around a major city) link by a continuous built up area. The words urbanized area (Defined by the Bureau of the Census as a community with a population of 2,500 or more) can also be used as well.
Agglomeration economies are the powerful forces that help explain the advantages of the "clustering effect" of many activities ranging from retailing to transport terminals. There are three major categories of agglomeration economies, and they are as follows:
Urbanization economies: Benefits derived from the agglomeration of population, namely common infrastructures (utilities or public transit), the availability, and diversity of labor and market size. Also, Urbanization economies are associated with the size of the city (the city of Tehran). Urbanization economies benefit accruing to individual households or consumer-oriented activities, resulting from the agglomeration of populations and the urbanization of an area, or to other economic activities benefiting from the access to a general labor force. The population is assumed to have similar or complementary needs for residential infrastructures, schools, health-care, and other service activities.
Industrialization economies: Benefits derived from the agglomeration of industrial activities, such as being their respective suppliers or customers.
An Industrialization economy is a type of agglomeration economies; external economies (benefits, savings, cost reductions) resulting from the spatial concentration of industrial activities (from their joint utilization of local industrial infrastructure); as different from, or overlapping with localization economies, and also, urbanization economies.
Localization economies. Benefits derived from the agglomeration of a set of activities near a specific facility (auto part industry near” Iran khodro” or “Saipa” carmaker industry in Iran) , let it be a transport terminal, a seat of government power or a large university. Localization economies are associated with the concentration of particular industries (The Industrial City of Araak). Localization economies= (external economies of localization). Agglomeration economies (benefits, cost reductions) resulting from the concentration of the same or similar activities: benefits resulting from the local access to a specialized work force or the specialized reputation of a locality (to which some but maybe not all of these specialized activities contribute.
Urban agglomeration is the spatial concentration of economic activity in cities such as: Tehran, Isfahan (between 1960 –1980). Urban agglomeration can also take the form of concentration in industry clusters or in centers of employment within cities such as: Araak, Bandar Abbas, Tabriz, and Karaj. These cities contain roughly 70 percent of the Iran population, and urban population densities in bigger cities like: Teheran, Shiraz, and Isfahan are approximately several times the average. It is not just aggregate activity that is agglomerated; individual industries are concentrated too. There are many examples. The auto industry is well-known for its spatial concentration, especially in the west of Tehran (between Tehran and Karaj) finance, business services, and the production of films and television programs are other notable examples of industrial clustering in Tehran. Agglomeration also takes place within cities in the form of densely developed downtowns and sub-centers. These patterns are not unique to Iran’s metropolitan cities. Capital and labors are highly agglomerated in every developed city in the country. There are some ways to look for evidence of localization and urbanization economies.
Some experts can identify the existence of an urban wage premium, with workers in cities of over a million residents (Tabriz, Karaj, Mashad, Shiraz, and Isfahan) earning roughly a third more in nominal wages than workers in cities of fewer than 100,000. Even after controlling for the selection of highly productive workers into cities, a significant premium remains. Various approaches have been adopted in modeling agglomeration economies. Perhaps the simplest is to assume that there is some sort of public good that can be shared more economically in a larger city or cluster. This force operates on both the production and consumption sides.
The important common element from all these explanations is that agglomeration is associated with situations where market outcomes are not guaranteed to be
Efficient. Productivity is enhanced by infrastructure, and utility is increasing in public goods. Agglomeration economies can also arise from thick market effects in search or matching.
The concept of agglomeration economies in Dubai (UAE) refers to savings or benefits derived from the clustering of activities external to the "firm" and are therefore part of "external economies.” However, as geographers, we may at times be more interested in the "clustering" than in the organizational boundaries of the firm. Thus, what is "external" would depend on the recognized boundaries. For example, the Major Hotels or High rise Buildings in the Palm islands of Dubai can be said to benefit from the agglomeration of its activities in this area. Thus, such benefits are external to the individual region (but, of course, internal to its own territory).
Agglomeration effects associated with the agglomeration of population and the resulting infrastructure facilities, labor pool and quality of life, for example: the cities of Tehran, Isfahan+ ("urbanization economies").
Agglomeration effects resulting from the clustering of industrial activities giving rise to an "industrial climate" (with positive and negative effects). (="Industrialization economies").
Finally, effects, which result from the agglomeration of specific activities that favor specialized facilities, labor pools, vocational training, political lobbies etc. (="localization economies").
Now that Dubai (UAE) has established itself as a modern and international city in the Persian Gulf Region, there is a major trend to promote its own regional assets, and its own unique cultural features. The new focus of the city is driven by strategies and projects that respect and bring the local identity into the planning and design projects. In this context, three approaches have emerged. The first approach calls for the renovation and reconstruction of the old urban fabric that was either destroyed or was in decay such as the Bastakiya district in Bur Dubai. The other approach promotes the importance of the unique local cultural heritage among the population and provides training and tools for the local government and city staff. The third calls for modern developments to be inspired from the local culture (i.e. the new Jumeirah Mall —a modern suq— and the new palm island—a modern real estate business project that is built on the reclaimed land from the sea with a palm shape as a plan design—).
Revenues in the Persian Gulf states(best example of agglomeration) were insufficient to keep pace with the growing cost of entitlements for a burgeoning population. In the early days of the oil boom (1970-1980), most of the oil-producing states created a social welfare network that was the most generous in the world. Free medical care, free education, low-cost housing, extremely inexpensive domestic telephone and transportation, and the world’s lowest prices for energy were among the benefits routinely provided to citizens of the region, often with no income tax.
At the same time, most of these states actively promoted population growth, creating a demographic explosion. In 1970, there were approximately 45 million people living on the shores of the Persian Gulf. By 1995, there were over 100 million people, and by the year 2010 there will be an estimated 162 million. Approximately two-thirds of the Gulf population is located in Iran called urbanization economies Region(Bandar Abbas, Bandar Lengeh, Bandar Bushehr), but the Arab in Persian Gulf states are steadily increasing their proportion of the total. Almost without exception, by the mid-1990’s these states were facing budgetary demands that exceeded their resources and were faces with the unpleasant prospect of reducing subsidies and cutting services that their citizens had come to expect as their birthright. The financial reserves that had been accumulated during the boom years of the 1970s were severely eroded by the costs of the war against Iraq in 1990-91.
The rapid increase in population(part of the side effect of negative urbanization economies), with no corresponding rise in oil revenues, pushed budgets into deficit and eroded per-capita earnings. Per-capita annual income in Saudi Arabia in 1996 was only $6,900, compared with some $19,000 in 1980 at the height of the oil boom. By the mid-1990s, the income of the average Saudi had declined to less than that of some developing countries, and below the World Bank’s rich-poor median line of $7,620.
Per –capita annual income in IRAN in 2006 was less than $3,600.
Iran shares many if the dilemmas of the other Persian Gulf states, particularly the reliance on oil as the source of most of its revenues. It is, however, the only country of the region to have a somewhat diversified industrial base. In addition to its exports of carpets and agricultural products, it manufactures steel, assembles automobiles, builds ships and small aircraft, and produces most of its own pharmaceutical, plastics and many other basic goods. Unlike the other Persian Gulf states, Iran derives nearly 20 percent of its state revenues from taxes, including an income tax.
Iran began a systematic effort to develop new markets in Central Asia, the Far East, South Asia, and East Africa, including the opening of a rail link from the ancient Silk Road to the Persian Gulf in the last decade.
The World Bank, in a report on the Persian gulf said the region had suffered from falling oil prices, a failure to train workers, a lack of economic liberalization and privatization, excess bureaucracy and the waste of resources in inefficient state-owned enterprises (especially in IRAN, Saudi Arabia , Bahrain, Oman). To reverse this, it noted, will take promoting non-oil exports, making the private sector more efficient, producing more skilled and flexible workers and reducing poverty by accelerating growth (Recent privatization in Iran is helping to reduce the poverty in long term “depend on right management and developing better and more effective comprehensive Master plan for the economy).
It is recommended that a set of fairly prosaic fiscal and public policy correctives: stimulation of an energetic private sector capable of generating jobs; privatization of many state-owned businesses(similar to what happened recently in Iran after passing the law Article 44 of the Iranian constitution which promoted the privatization in large scale and selling state owned factories to private sectors and promoting the foreign investors to invest and making the law more suitable for them in IRAN,) reevaluation of the extraordinarily generous entitlements that were adopted in the 1980’s; curbing population growth(Example Iran in the last 10 years); gradual reduction of subsidies on goods and services; the introduction of taxes or user fees; improved education and training of citizens to make them more competitive in the private-sector market(private universities and institutions in metropolitan Cities such as Tehran , Isfahan , Mashad , Tabris and other big cities and provinces);
Iraj Akbarieh spokesperson of the industries and mines ministery said In IRAN 80 percent of the mineral and industrial companies will be privatized by the end of current Iranian year (March 19, 2008) in line with enforcement of the Article 44 of the Constitution.
Accelerating the privatization In Iran speeding up In the second half of current Iranian year the permits of selling 51 percent, 48 percent, and 48 percent of the shares of Khozestan Steel Company, Khorassan Steel Company will be issued respectively. That will reduce the power of the state to control the economy and will help to bring in the right direction to decrease the inflation rate and brings the unemployment below 10% in the near future.
Sources:
Urban Agglomeration William C. Strange
Economic Geography Glossary
Local identity in a Global Context : The case of Dubai, UAE
The Coming Crisis In the Persian Gulf
The Persian Gulf of the Millennium: Essays in Politics, Economy, Security, and Religion. St. Martins Press; New York 1997.
Mehrnews agency on October 21 , 2007
Urban Agglomeration Economies in IRAN and other Persian Gulf Countries
In the study of human settlements, an agglomeration is an extended city or town area, comprising of a built-up area of a central place (usually a municipality) and any suburbs (the usually residential region around a major city) link by a continuous built up area. The words urbanized area (Defined by the Bureau of the Census as a community with a population of 2,500 or more) can also be used as well.
Agglomeration economies are the powerful forces that help explain the advantages of the "clustering effect" of many activities ranging from retailing to transport terminals. There are three major categories of agglomeration economies, and they are as follows:
Urbanization economies: Benefits derived from the agglomeration of population, namely common infrastructures (utilities or public transit), the availability, and diversity of labor and market size. Also, Urbanization economies are associated with the size of the city (the city of Tehran). Urbanization economies benefit accruing to individual households or consumer-oriented activities, resulting from the agglomeration of populations and the urbanization of an area, or to other economic activities benefiting from the access to a general labor force. The population is assumed to have similar or complementary needs for residential infrastructures, schools, health-care, and other service activities.
Industrialization economies: Benefits derived from the agglomeration of industrial activities, such as being their respective suppliers or customers.
An Industrialization economy is a type of agglomeration economies; external economies (benefits, savings, cost reductions) resulting from the spatial concentration of industrial activities (from their joint utilization of local industrial infrastructure); as different from, or overlapping with localization economies, and also, urbanization economies.
Localization economies. Benefits derived from the agglomeration of a set of activities near a specific facility (auto part industry near” Iran khodro” or “Saipa” carmaker industry in Iran) , let it be a transport terminal, a seat of government power or a large university. Localization economies are associated with the concentration of particular industries (The Industrial City of Araak). Localization economies= (external economies of localization). Agglomeration economies (benefits, cost reductions) resulting from the concentration of the same or similar activities: benefits resulting from the local access to a specialized work force or the specialized reputation of a locality (to which some but maybe not all of these specialized activities contribute.
Urban agglomeration is the spatial concentration of economic activity in cities such as: Tehran, Isfahan (between 1960 –1980). Urban agglomeration can also take the form of concentration in industry clusters or in centers of employment within cities such as: Araak, Bandar Abbas, Tabriz, and Karaj. These cities contain roughly 70 percent of the Iran population, and urban population densities in bigger cities like: Teheran, Shiraz, and Isfahan are approximately several times the average. It is not just aggregate activity that is agglomerated; individual industries are concentrated too. There are many examples. The auto industry is well-known for its spatial concentration, especially in the west of Tehran (between Tehran and Karaj) finance, business services, and the production of films and television programs are other notable examples of industrial clustering in Tehran. Agglomeration also takes place within cities in the form of densely developed downtowns and sub-centers. These patterns are not unique to Iran’s metropolitan cities. Capital and labors are highly agglomerated in every developed city in the country. There are some ways to look for evidence of localization and urbanization economies.
Some experts can identify the existence of an urban wage premium, with workers in cities of over a million residents (Tabriz, Karaj, Mashad, Shiraz, and Isfahan) earning roughly a third more in nominal wages than workers in cities of fewer than 100,000. Even after controlling for the selection of highly productive workers into cities, a significant premium remains. Various approaches have been adopted in modeling agglomeration economies. Perhaps the simplest is to assume that there is some sort of public good that can be shared more economically in a larger city or cluster. This force operates on both the production and consumption sides.
The important common element from all these explanations is that agglomeration is associated with situations where market outcomes are not guaranteed to be
Efficient. Productivity is enhanced by infrastructure, and utility is increasing in public goods. Agglomeration economies can also arise from thick market effects in search or matching.
The concept of agglomeration economies in Dubai (UAE) refers to savings or benefits derived from the clustering of activities external to the "firm" and are therefore part of "external economies.” However, as geographers, we may at times be more interested in the "clustering" than in the organizational boundaries of the firm. Thus, what is "external" would depend on the recognized boundaries. For example, the Major Hotels or High rise Buildings in the Palm islands of Dubai can be said to benefit from the agglomeration of its activities in this area. Thus, such benefits are external to the individual region (but, of course, internal to its own territory).
Agglomeration effects associated with the agglomeration of population and the resulting infrastructure facilities, labor pool and quality of life, for example: the cities of Tehran, Isfahan+ ("urbanization economies").
Agglomeration effects resulting from the clustering of industrial activities giving rise to an "industrial climate" (with positive and negative effects). (="Industrialization economies").
Finally, effects, which result from the agglomeration of specific activities that favor specialized facilities, labor pools, vocational training, political lobbies etc. (="localization economies").
Now that Dubai (UAE) has established itself as a modern and international city in the Persian Gulf Region, there is a major trend to promote its own regional assets, and its own unique cultural features. The new focus of the city is driven by strategies and projects that respect and bring the local identity into the planning and design projects. In this context, three approaches have emerged. The first approach calls for the renovation and reconstruction of the old urban fabric that was either destroyed or was in decay such as the Bastakiya district in Bur Dubai. The other approach promotes the importance of the unique local cultural heritage among the population and provides training and tools for the local government and city staff. The third calls for modern developments to be inspired from the local culture (i.e. the new Jumeirah Mall —a modern suq— and the new palm island—a modern real estate business project that is built on the reclaimed land from the sea with a palm shape as a plan design—).
Revenues in the Persian Gulf states(best example of agglomeration) were insufficient to keep pace with the growing cost of entitlements for a burgeoning population. In the early days of the oil boom (1970-1980), most of the oil-producing states created a social welfare network that was the most generous in the world. Free medical care, free education, low-cost housing, extremely inexpensive domestic telephone and transportation, and the world’s lowest prices for energy were among the benefits routinely provided to citizens of the region, often with no income tax.
At the same time, most of these states actively promoted population growth, creating a demographic explosion. In 1970, there were approximately 45 million people living on the shores of the Persian Gulf. By 1995, there were over 100 million people, and by the year 2010 there will be an estimated 162 million. Approximately two-thirds of the Gulf population is located in Iran called urbanization economies Region(Bandar Abbas, Bandar Lengeh, Bandar Bushehr), but the Arab in Persian Gulf states are steadily increasing their proportion of the total. Almost without exception, by the mid-1990’s these states were facing budgetary demands that exceeded their resources and were faces with the unpleasant prospect of reducing subsidies and cutting services that their citizens had come to expect as their birthright. The financial reserves that had been accumulated during the boom years of the 1970s were severely eroded by the costs of the war against Iraq in 1990-91.
The rapid increase in population(part of the side effect of negative urbanization economies), with no corresponding rise in oil revenues, pushed budgets into deficit and eroded per-capita earnings. Per-capita annual income in Saudi Arabia in 1996 was only $6,900, compared with some $19,000 in 1980 at the height of the oil boom. By the mid-1990s, the income of the average Saudi had declined to less than that of some developing countries, and below the World Bank’s rich-poor median line of $7,620.
Per –capita annual income in IRAN in 2006 was less than $3,600.
Iran shares many if the dilemmas of the other Persian Gulf states, particularly the reliance on oil as the source of most of its revenues. It is, however, the only country of the region to have a somewhat diversified industrial base. In addition to its exports of carpets and agricultural products, it manufactures steel, assembles automobiles, builds ships and small aircraft, and produces most of its own pharmaceutical, plastics and many other basic goods. Unlike the other Persian Gulf states, Iran derives nearly 20 percent of its state revenues from taxes, including an income tax.
Iran began a systematic effort to develop new markets in Central Asia, the Far East, South Asia, and East Africa, including the opening of a rail link from the ancient Silk Road to the Persian Gulf in the last decade.
The World Bank, in a report on the Persian gulf said the region had suffered from falling oil prices, a failure to train workers, a lack of economic liberalization and privatization, excess bureaucracy and the waste of resources in inefficient state-owned enterprises (especially in IRAN, Saudi Arabia , Bahrain, Oman). To reverse this, it noted, will take promoting non-oil exports, making the private sector more efficient, producing more skilled and flexible workers and reducing poverty by accelerating growth (Recent privatization in Iran is helping to reduce the poverty in long term “depend on right management and developing better and more effective comprehensive Master plan for the economy).
It is recommended that a set of fairly prosaic fiscal and public policy correctives: stimulation of an energetic private sector capable of generating jobs; privatization of many state-owned businesses(similar to what happened recently in Iran after passing the law Article 44 of the Iranian constitution which promoted the privatization in large scale and selling state owned factories to private sectors and promoting the foreign investors to invest and making the law more suitable for them in IRAN,) reevaluation of the extraordinarily generous entitlements that were adopted in the 1980’s; curbing population growth(Example Iran in the last 10 years); gradual reduction of subsidies on goods and services; the introduction of taxes or user fees; improved education and training of citizens to make them more competitive in the private-sector market(private universities and institutions in metropolitan Cities such as Tehran , Isfahan , Mashad , Tabris and other big cities and provinces);
Iraj Akbarieh spokesperson of the industries and mines ministery said In IRAN 80 percent of the mineral and industrial companies will be privatized by the end of current Iranian year (March 19, 2008) in line with enforcement of the Article 44 of the Constitution.
Accelerating the privatization In Iran speeding up In the second half of current Iranian year the permits of selling 51 percent, 48 percent, and 48 percent of the shares of Khozestan Steel Company, Khorassan Steel Company will be issued respectively. That will reduce the power of the state to control the economy and will help to bring in the right direction to decrease the inflation rate and brings the unemployment below 10% in the near future.
Sources:
Urban Agglomeration William C. Strange
Economic Geography Glossary
Local identity in a Global Context : The case of Dubai, UAE
The Coming Crisis In the Persian Gulf
The Persian Gulf of the Millennium: Essays in Politics, Economy, Security, and Religion. St. Martins Press; New York 1997.
Mehrnews agency on October 21 , 2007
UAE and its dilema in the persian gulf
Morteza Aminmansour
UAE and Its dilemma in the Persian Gulf:
At present, Iran has no complaint against the sovereignty of any Country in Persian Gulf over their lands... However, every so often the neighboring countries, and especially the UAE, come up with unbelievable claims, which are bound to result in war and conflict in the region... The Arab countries in the region are taking advantage of the U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf region and Iraq and of their relations with the Western countries. The UAE must not be allowed even to raise the question of the three Iranian islands (Abu Musa, Greater Tonb, Lesser Tonb).
The arguments presented in Kayhan over Bahrain are correct and I as a writer support this no matter who wrote the article. Bahrain did once belong to Iran, but today Iran has no claim to sovereignty over it. We Iranian are respecting the sovereignty of our Arab neighbors. As long they respect our Sovereignty regarding our three Iranian Islands.
No matter if Bahrain is and will remain
An Arab State contended that the statements against Bahrain is not an evidence of Iran's desperate attempts to impose its hegemony on the Persian Gulf states: Iran is not falling back on the language of confrontation and threats isolated because of its policy and does not need antagonizes an overwhelming majority of the world's countries. Iran has not resorted to such language or demanding the return of Bahrain or inciting the Bahraini people to overthrow their government. Bahraini government is better taking care of own problems instead of repeating its support for undemocratic puppet government of UAE with its claim over three Iranian Islands.
There are always some reasons for accusing the Arab Governments in the Persian Gulf regimes of illegitimacy. These regimes, which we view as illegitimate, ones have supported Iraqi Government and with the money of these States our country was bombed and we closed our eyes and forgot everything about these puppet governments that even are not able to have control over its natural resources. Iran has not recognized own mistakes in the field of economy. Mismanagement of import regulation has brought our country to the point that we are dependent on UAE ports. What we need is to trust ourselves and spending more money for developing our ports which is desperately needed to provide more jobs for own people and reduce the poverty in our country but unfortunately our irresponsible politician sending the money to these Arab countries with very bad human rights report for importing material and product that our country desperately needed And we Iranian must realize that since the dawn of history our region has been entirely Iranian, and our Islands has been always Persian and our Gulf remain forever Persian gulf.
With its political orientations, May be, Iran has not been able to convince the world of its peaceful intentions for nuclear energy because of its behavior, Radicalism, provocative declarations, and continuous attempts to interfere with its neighbors' internal affairs. But that is the result of billion of dollars Oil money has been used against Iranian people by these Arab countries (UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia). For instance UAE Money or Saudis are supporting financially the terrorist groups to destabilize inside and outside of our country.
Calling the Persian Gulf states to build defense alliances among themselves and with other strong countries in order to deal with Iran can not help these puppet governments to save its regimes. The Persian people cannot be racist, imperialist or aggressive and will not find an alternative way to creating problems such as the current political crisis in fighting the terrorism in neighboring Persian Gulf states.
Iran was in the last decades more successful in fighting terrorism than other Persian Gulf countries at the same time.
Iran lost more security officer in fighting drugs and terrorism and finally Iran has been the victim of terrorism for many decades.
"Iranian are sick and tired of listening over and over again to the same old narrative resorted Story of Arab regimes such as Bahrain after separation from the motherland IRAN and UAE elites since the independence in 1971. Every time they face either an internal problem or a crisis in the region or on the international level, they take refuge in stirring up trouble with the country neighboring IRAN, in an attempt to divert own public opinion or alleviate the domestic pressure.
This is an appeal to the Persian Gulf states to consolidate their security strategy with IRAN rather than other country in order to deal with external challenges and aspirations that is coming from extreme Moslem community such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE. PGCC members included IRAN should have a unified military defense strategy. In addition, they must form military alliances and agreements, on a regional basis, with strong and prominent Arab and none Arab Muslim countries such as IRAN as part of a regional defense strategy.
Spending of billions of dollars by Arab countries in Persian gulf against IRAN will not lead to Iran's isolation in the region or its nuclear program, out of concern definitely this program will not confirm its expansionist aspirations. If Iran has been the object of concern on account of its nuclear program. It is also know that UAE becomes an object of concern because of its human rights abuses and claims over the Iranian Islands and territorial dispute with other neighbors.
Even if we view such statements (claim over Iranian Islands) as a sort of negative diplomacy leading by UAE intended to the world's attention over Iran, this has not harmed Iran in any respect, by reinforcing the Persian Gulf states' mistrust of Iran and causing its total isolation in the region.
Iranian people have been trying to improve and mend relations with their neighbors and to restore the mutual trust that has been lost or misunderstood. But in contrary UAE is unnecessarily heating up the atmosphere, thereby causing serious damage to future relations with its neighbors including IRAN In addition, our country will not lose kind of tentative manifestations of support for its rights to the nuclear project (we need electricity for running our industries and do not want to import oil from outside ).
That is our right to have nuclear energy in a peaceful way that secures our economy for next decades.
After all no one will doubt about it that Iran will ever stop its aspirations to its peaceful nuclear program and defending motherland including our three Islands. These aspirations will not become a real threat to the neighboring countries. Nuclear power will turn Iran into a force that guarantee its need to turn IRAN in a new phase of industrialization without fear of any objection. These declarations reflect economic and strategic plan, which reveals not only a small part of what Iran will be capable of doing or should achieve in short or long term.
Source:
Kayhan Iranian newspaper
Saudi daily Al-Yawm,
Kuwaiti daily Al-Siyassa,
Akhbar Al-Khalij,
The Bahraini daily Al-Ayyam
UAE and Its dilemma in the Persian Gulf:
At present, Iran has no complaint against the sovereignty of any Country in Persian Gulf over their lands... However, every so often the neighboring countries, and especially the UAE, come up with unbelievable claims, which are bound to result in war and conflict in the region... The Arab countries in the region are taking advantage of the U.S. presence in the Persian Gulf region and Iraq and of their relations with the Western countries. The UAE must not be allowed even to raise the question of the three Iranian islands (Abu Musa, Greater Tonb, Lesser Tonb).
The arguments presented in Kayhan over Bahrain are correct and I as a writer support this no matter who wrote the article. Bahrain did once belong to Iran, but today Iran has no claim to sovereignty over it. We Iranian are respecting the sovereignty of our Arab neighbors. As long they respect our Sovereignty regarding our three Iranian Islands.
No matter if Bahrain is and will remain
An Arab State contended that the statements against Bahrain is not an evidence of Iran's desperate attempts to impose its hegemony on the Persian Gulf states: Iran is not falling back on the language of confrontation and threats isolated because of its policy and does not need antagonizes an overwhelming majority of the world's countries. Iran has not resorted to such language or demanding the return of Bahrain or inciting the Bahraini people to overthrow their government. Bahraini government is better taking care of own problems instead of repeating its support for undemocratic puppet government of UAE with its claim over three Iranian Islands.
There are always some reasons for accusing the Arab Governments in the Persian Gulf regimes of illegitimacy. These regimes, which we view as illegitimate, ones have supported Iraqi Government and with the money of these States our country was bombed and we closed our eyes and forgot everything about these puppet governments that even are not able to have control over its natural resources. Iran has not recognized own mistakes in the field of economy. Mismanagement of import regulation has brought our country to the point that we are dependent on UAE ports. What we need is to trust ourselves and spending more money for developing our ports which is desperately needed to provide more jobs for own people and reduce the poverty in our country but unfortunately our irresponsible politician sending the money to these Arab countries with very bad human rights report for importing material and product that our country desperately needed And we Iranian must realize that since the dawn of history our region has been entirely Iranian, and our Islands has been always Persian and our Gulf remain forever Persian gulf.
With its political orientations, May be, Iran has not been able to convince the world of its peaceful intentions for nuclear energy because of its behavior, Radicalism, provocative declarations, and continuous attempts to interfere with its neighbors' internal affairs. But that is the result of billion of dollars Oil money has been used against Iranian people by these Arab countries (UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia). For instance UAE Money or Saudis are supporting financially the terrorist groups to destabilize inside and outside of our country.
Calling the Persian Gulf states to build defense alliances among themselves and with other strong countries in order to deal with Iran can not help these puppet governments to save its regimes. The Persian people cannot be racist, imperialist or aggressive and will not find an alternative way to creating problems such as the current political crisis in fighting the terrorism in neighboring Persian Gulf states.
Iran was in the last decades more successful in fighting terrorism than other Persian Gulf countries at the same time.
Iran lost more security officer in fighting drugs and terrorism and finally Iran has been the victim of terrorism for many decades.
"Iranian are sick and tired of listening over and over again to the same old narrative resorted Story of Arab regimes such as Bahrain after separation from the motherland IRAN and UAE elites since the independence in 1971. Every time they face either an internal problem or a crisis in the region or on the international level, they take refuge in stirring up trouble with the country neighboring IRAN, in an attempt to divert own public opinion or alleviate the domestic pressure.
This is an appeal to the Persian Gulf states to consolidate their security strategy with IRAN rather than other country in order to deal with external challenges and aspirations that is coming from extreme Moslem community such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, UAE. PGCC members included IRAN should have a unified military defense strategy. In addition, they must form military alliances and agreements, on a regional basis, with strong and prominent Arab and none Arab Muslim countries such as IRAN as part of a regional defense strategy.
Spending of billions of dollars by Arab countries in Persian gulf against IRAN will not lead to Iran's isolation in the region or its nuclear program, out of concern definitely this program will not confirm its expansionist aspirations. If Iran has been the object of concern on account of its nuclear program. It is also know that UAE becomes an object of concern because of its human rights abuses and claims over the Iranian Islands and territorial dispute with other neighbors.
Even if we view such statements (claim over Iranian Islands) as a sort of negative diplomacy leading by UAE intended to the world's attention over Iran, this has not harmed Iran in any respect, by reinforcing the Persian Gulf states' mistrust of Iran and causing its total isolation in the region.
Iranian people have been trying to improve and mend relations with their neighbors and to restore the mutual trust that has been lost or misunderstood. But in contrary UAE is unnecessarily heating up the atmosphere, thereby causing serious damage to future relations with its neighbors including IRAN In addition, our country will not lose kind of tentative manifestations of support for its rights to the nuclear project (we need electricity for running our industries and do not want to import oil from outside ).
That is our right to have nuclear energy in a peaceful way that secures our economy for next decades.
After all no one will doubt about it that Iran will ever stop its aspirations to its peaceful nuclear program and defending motherland including our three Islands. These aspirations will not become a real threat to the neighboring countries. Nuclear power will turn Iran into a force that guarantee its need to turn IRAN in a new phase of industrialization without fear of any objection. These declarations reflect economic and strategic plan, which reveals not only a small part of what Iran will be capable of doing or should achieve in short or long term.
Source:
Kayhan Iranian newspaper
Saudi daily Al-Yawm,
Kuwaiti daily Al-Siyassa,
Akhbar Al-Khalij,
The Bahraini daily Al-Ayyam
The strategies behind the poverty Reduction in Iran and middle east
Morteza Aminmansour
The Strategies behind the poverty Reduction in IRAN and Middle East:
Poverty is hunger. Poverty is lack of shelter. Poverty is being sick and not being able to see a doctor. Poverty is not having access to school and not knowing how to read. Poverty is not having a job, is fear for the future, living one day at a time. Poverty is losing a child to illness brought about by unclean water. Poverty is powerlessness, lack of representation and freedom.
Poverty has been a constant feature of society throughout history. History shows that poverty has always existed in the lives of people. However, it is also a historical fact that although the majority of people have lived in poverty, the remaining minority has lived in luxury. This is also valid in today’s societies and nations. Again, while some countries, called first world countries, live in a very luxurious manner, the remaining countries, called third world countries, live in poverty. This also shows that poverty has been a social phenomenon and a serious problem in past and present history.
Poverty has many faces, changing from place to place and across time, and has been described in many ways. Most often, poverty is a situation people want to escape. So poverty is a call to action -- for the poor and the wealthy alike -- a call to change the world so that many more may have enough to eat, adequate shelter, access to education and health, protection from violence, and a voice in what happens in their communities
Population below poverty line (%):
Afghanistan 53%, Azerbaijan 49%, Armenia 34.6%, Turkey 20%, Turkmenistan 58%,
Syria 11.9%, In Iran Population below poverty line was: 40% (CIA World Fact book April 17,2007). .
The report states that there has been little progress in poverty reduction in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region since the mid 1980s. The slow growth can be at the origin of this lack of progress in poverty reduction.
Slow growth, has a social cost. In the region, average per capita income grew by only 1 percent per annum between 1985 and 2000. Roughly over the same period of time, the number of poor grew by 11.5 million to reach 52 million. This shows what happens when populations continue to grow, while economies don't.
Surprisingly, the lack of income growth did not constrain human development in MENA. While per capita incomes stagnated, health and education indicators improved tremendously. For example, between 1985 and 2000, literacy spread from 47 to 69 percent of the population, child mortality rates plunged from 108 per thousand to 46 per thousand, and average years of schooling rose from 3.2 to 5.4. Indeed, the region did better than its middle-income comparators over this period
There is reason to believe, that the gains in human indicators were due to a combination of factors including enhanced private spending and improvements in the delivery of public health and education services (for example IRAN). This is an encouraging finding. It suggests that, even in the absence of income growth, it is possible to improve health and education attainments through attention to public service delivery. It provides a strong empirical justification for the Bank's operational focus on such issue.
Labor supply depends on population—its age composition, gender composition, skill level, global distribution and migration patterns. The exhibit below examines labor supply trends by region for 1980 and 1999 and forecasts to 2015. Developing economies account for 74% of the global working age population and these economies’ labor forces are expected to expand very rapidly over the coming decade. Across the regions, the labor force in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and the Middle East North Africa is expected to increase by at least 2 percent per year. Population growth is the principal factor driving labor force growth and, while this has slowed in developing countries, the working age population continues to increase (as population growth slowdown only feeds through to a labor force slowdown with a lag.
In terms of jobs, the growth rates suggest the coming on stream of 35 to 40 million jobs each year in the developing world. The regional labor force growth rates translate into the net creation of some 7 million jobs per annum in Sub Saharan Africa, 23 million jobs in Asia and 100 million jobs in the Middle East (including Iran and neighboring countries) North Africa (Bourguignon, 2005 and World Bank, 2004). Failure to meet this challenge will result in increased unemployment and underemployment, declining wage rates and quality of jobs. These negative consequences, will primarily affect the youth segment of the population and the low skilled.
During the 1979-85 period, absolute poverty in IRAN increased by 40 percent; some reports indicated that absolute poverty had spread among as many as 65-75 percent of the population in 1988. According to the IMF, 53 percent of Iranians still live below the poverty line.
All of us are Iranian and wherever and in whatever post we are should try to elevate status of our dear country (Professor Majid Samee) and eliminate the poverty in our country. Iran belongs to all of us no matter what race or religion we have.
Health conditions outside major Iranian cities are poor. Many small towns and rural areas (Remote areas, such as Hormozgan, Sistan Baluchestan, Khorassan, Khozestan, Ilam and chahar mahal Bakhtiyari provinces suffer from unsanitary conditions and a shortage of medical personnel and facilities. The infant mortality rate remains a serious problem in IRAN; it is very high by world and Middle Eastern standards, although it has been reduced significantly (26 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1998, down from 91.6 during 1980-85 and 50 during 1991-95). Although primary education is compulsory for 5 years, many rural children never attend school because of either parental objection(financial problem of the families and using children as child labor ) or a lack of facilities(lack of money ). The secondary-school system in Iran is relatively underdeveloped, and it serves for the most part to prepare small numbers of students for university-level education. In order to improve the situation for the poorest segments of Iranian society, the government is considering an anti-poverty program comprising expanded provision of food, clothing, health care, education, social security, and bank credits to these people. .
In the Middle East and North Africa, the percentage of people living on less than $1 per day declined slightly, but the proportion living below $2 per day increased, from 25 to 30 percent of the population, because of increases in Egypt, Morocco, and Yemen.
SOURCE: United Nations. Human Development Report 2000; Trends in human development and per capita income.
GDP per Capita (US$)
Country
1975
1980
1985
1990
1998
Iran
1,611
1,129
1,208
1,056
1,275
United States
19,364
21,529
23,200
25,363
29,683
Saudi Arabia
9,658
11,553
7,437
7,100
6,516
Qatar
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
SOURCE: United Nations. Human Development Report 2000; Trends in human development and per capita income"In Iran the Ministry of Housing has built many accommodations but we must ask this ministry, how many of these constructions built are housing poor people", the Majlis deputy from Urumiyeh (northwest Iran) said.Abbaspour warned that Iran was becoming a country with vastly separated social classes. He said "In the past 25 years. The Country has witnessed immense pressures in society, indicating social injustice. This phenomenon has led to the rise of social ills such as homeless tramps in Big Cities such as Tehran, Isfahan, Shiraz, Tabriz, Mashad, Kerman, Arak higher divorce rates, poverty, and prostitution.Abbaspour, a member of the Males Social Affairs Committee, blamed the government for turning a blind eye to pervasive corruption in Iran. We have to seek the root of the corruption first in Parliament and other government institutions. Ordinary Iranian are paying high price for these lawlessness and the middle class is disappearing from Iranian society in the next 5 or 10 years.
Sources: * Middle East and North Africa (: World Bank)
Poverty in Middle East and North Africa.
*Understanding Poverty (World bank)
Poverty in Traditional Islamic Thought: by Osman GÜNER
The World Bank Group: Income Poverty
IRAN FOCUS: Sep 26,07(Poverty in IRAN)
The Strategies behind the poverty Reduction in IRAN and Middle East:
Poverty is hunger. Poverty is lack of shelter. Poverty is being sick and not being able to see a doctor. Poverty is not having access to school and not knowing how to read. Poverty is not having a job, is fear for the future, living one day at a time. Poverty is losing a child to illness brought about by unclean water. Poverty is powerlessness, lack of representation and freedom.
Poverty has been a constant feature of society throughout history. History shows that poverty has always existed in the lives of people. However, it is also a historical fact that although the majority of people have lived in poverty, the remaining minority has lived in luxury. This is also valid in today’s societies and nations. Again, while some countries, called first world countries, live in a very luxurious manner, the remaining countries, called third world countries, live in poverty. This also shows that poverty has been a social phenomenon and a serious problem in past and present history.
Poverty has many faces, changing from place to place and across time, and has been described in many ways. Most often, poverty is a situation people want to escape. So poverty is a call to action -- for the poor and the wealthy alike -- a call to change the world so that many more may have enough to eat, adequate shelter, access to education and health, protection from violence, and a voice in what happens in their communities
Population below poverty line (%):
Afghanistan 53%, Azerbaijan 49%, Armenia 34.6%, Turkey 20%, Turkmenistan 58%,
Syria 11.9%, In Iran Population below poverty line was: 40% (CIA World Fact book April 17,2007). .
The report states that there has been little progress in poverty reduction in the MENA (Middle East and North Africa) region since the mid 1980s. The slow growth can be at the origin of this lack of progress in poverty reduction.
Slow growth, has a social cost. In the region, average per capita income grew by only 1 percent per annum between 1985 and 2000. Roughly over the same period of time, the number of poor grew by 11.5 million to reach 52 million. This shows what happens when populations continue to grow, while economies don't.
Surprisingly, the lack of income growth did not constrain human development in MENA. While per capita incomes stagnated, health and education indicators improved tremendously. For example, between 1985 and 2000, literacy spread from 47 to 69 percent of the population, child mortality rates plunged from 108 per thousand to 46 per thousand, and average years of schooling rose from 3.2 to 5.4. Indeed, the region did better than its middle-income comparators over this period
There is reason to believe, that the gains in human indicators were due to a combination of factors including enhanced private spending and improvements in the delivery of public health and education services (for example IRAN). This is an encouraging finding. It suggests that, even in the absence of income growth, it is possible to improve health and education attainments through attention to public service delivery. It provides a strong empirical justification for the Bank's operational focus on such issue.
Labor supply depends on population—its age composition, gender composition, skill level, global distribution and migration patterns. The exhibit below examines labor supply trends by region for 1980 and 1999 and forecasts to 2015. Developing economies account for 74% of the global working age population and these economies’ labor forces are expected to expand very rapidly over the coming decade. Across the regions, the labor force in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and the Middle East North Africa is expected to increase by at least 2 percent per year. Population growth is the principal factor driving labor force growth and, while this has slowed in developing countries, the working age population continues to increase (as population growth slowdown only feeds through to a labor force slowdown with a lag.
In terms of jobs, the growth rates suggest the coming on stream of 35 to 40 million jobs each year in the developing world. The regional labor force growth rates translate into the net creation of some 7 million jobs per annum in Sub Saharan Africa, 23 million jobs in Asia and 100 million jobs in the Middle East (including Iran and neighboring countries) North Africa (Bourguignon, 2005 and World Bank, 2004). Failure to meet this challenge will result in increased unemployment and underemployment, declining wage rates and quality of jobs. These negative consequences, will primarily affect the youth segment of the population and the low skilled.
During the 1979-85 period, absolute poverty in IRAN increased by 40 percent; some reports indicated that absolute poverty had spread among as many as 65-75 percent of the population in 1988. According to the IMF, 53 percent of Iranians still live below the poverty line.
All of us are Iranian and wherever and in whatever post we are should try to elevate status of our dear country (Professor Majid Samee) and eliminate the poverty in our country. Iran belongs to all of us no matter what race or religion we have.
Health conditions outside major Iranian cities are poor. Many small towns and rural areas (Remote areas, such as Hormozgan, Sistan Baluchestan, Khorassan, Khozestan, Ilam and chahar mahal Bakhtiyari provinces suffer from unsanitary conditions and a shortage of medical personnel and facilities. The infant mortality rate remains a serious problem in IRAN; it is very high by world and Middle Eastern standards, although it has been reduced significantly (26 deaths per 1,000 live births in 1998, down from 91.6 during 1980-85 and 50 during 1991-95). Although primary education is compulsory for 5 years, many rural children never attend school because of either parental objection(financial problem of the families and using children as child labor ) or a lack of facilities(lack of money ). The secondary-school system in Iran is relatively underdeveloped, and it serves for the most part to prepare small numbers of students for university-level education. In order to improve the situation for the poorest segments of Iranian society, the government is considering an anti-poverty program comprising expanded provision of food, clothing, health care, education, social security, and bank credits to these people. .
In the Middle East and North Africa, the percentage of people living on less than $1 per day declined slightly, but the proportion living below $2 per day increased, from 25 to 30 percent of the population, because of increases in Egypt, Morocco, and Yemen.
SOURCE: United Nations. Human Development Report 2000; Trends in human development and per capita income.
GDP per Capita (US$)
Country
1975
1980
1985
1990
1998
Iran
1,611
1,129
1,208
1,056
1,275
United States
19,364
21,529
23,200
25,363
29,683
Saudi Arabia
9,658
11,553
7,437
7,100
6,516
Qatar
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
N/A
SOURCE: United Nations. Human Development Report 2000; Trends in human development and per capita income"In Iran the Ministry of Housing has built many accommodations but we must ask this ministry, how many of these constructions built are housing poor people", the Majlis deputy from Urumiyeh (northwest Iran) said.Abbaspour warned that Iran was becoming a country with vastly separated social classes. He said "In the past 25 years. The Country has witnessed immense pressures in society, indicating social injustice. This phenomenon has led to the rise of social ills such as homeless tramps in Big Cities such as Tehran, Isfahan, Shiraz, Tabriz, Mashad, Kerman, Arak higher divorce rates, poverty, and prostitution.Abbaspour, a member of the Males Social Affairs Committee, blamed the government for turning a blind eye to pervasive corruption in Iran. We have to seek the root of the corruption first in Parliament and other government institutions. Ordinary Iranian are paying high price for these lawlessness and the middle class is disappearing from Iranian society in the next 5 or 10 years.
Sources: * Middle East and North Africa (: World Bank)
Poverty in Middle East and North Africa.
*Understanding Poverty (World bank)
Poverty in Traditional Islamic Thought: by Osman GÜNER
The World Bank Group: Income Poverty
IRAN FOCUS: Sep 26,07(Poverty in IRAN)
The concepts of urbanization in Iran and other persian gulf countries
By: Morteza Aminmansour
The Concepts of Urbanization in Iran and other Persian Gulf countries:
Urbanization, by definition, is the increase in population over time. Urbanization has profound effects on economy, ecology, and lifestyles of the area's inhabitants. Terms such as urban sprawl, urban sociology, and new urbanism are all terms that come as a result of such urbanization. But, urbanization isn't new; rather an old concept that has recently catalyzed into something increasingly more common- a new way of life. Urbanization doesn't necessarily require a trip to the city to see, for example it can be readily viewed just 15 minutes from my hometown, in a town called Metropolitan Tehran, Tabriz, Isfahan or smaller cities like Mahabad, Marivan, Baneh, Bijar, Ilam, Although urbanization would be easier to see in populous areas, urbanization itself, I think, would be much stronger grasped as a concept if done on a developing community, and projecting its future. This town of Baneh has a population of about 113,585(2006). It is a fair sized town, having many things such as a City Hall, Police station, Bookstore, Grocery market, numerous restaurants, and a shopping center (Bazaar). The recent spur of growth in Baneh or Ilam is also readily apparent, and fortunately so that I may analyze such growth as an example. It is astonish and remarkable that the most industrialized part of an urban area in any of Iranian major metropolitans are most usually in or around the center of the town or city. In Isfahan, Mashad or other smaller cities such as Abadan, Dezful, in major cities of UAE (Dubai, Abu Dhabi) and Oman (Manah, Masira, Barka, Bahla) big cities in Saudi Arabia (Riyadh, Al jubayl, Doha, Ahufuf) there is a common square that showcases different businesses and services from food, to other businesses such as Rug dealers, to fruit supplies, and many other things. This small, dense area is both a large factor in employment and a common shopping district for customers. This, of course, would mean that residential areas would have to be near, if one was to obtain a job or shop at these areas. Not even two blocks away, the residents of Iranian cities have housing and apartments all around the square. Ranging from old, two-story houses, to smaller, Apartments in the recent 28 years, and of course older homes that were more often than not shabby and worn.
Traditional urbanization exhibits a concentration of human activities and settlements around the downtown area. When the residential area shifts outward this is called suburbanization( such as suburban cities around tehran were built in the last 50 years).
The increase in the proportion of the population residing in towns, brought about by migration of rural populations into towns and cities (because of many reason for example economical or social circumstances and of course to add the war Iraq against Iran between 1980-88, and/or the higher urban levels of natural (In human ecology, a spontaneously arising and individual area of an urban society with common social, economic, and cultural characteristics: a distinctive community. Most cities contain numbers of natural areas, which are delimited by informal boundaries, such as canals, parks, railways, rivers, and main roads).
Increase resulting from the greater proportion of people of childbearing age in cities this, in turn, reflects patterns of migration (The movement of people from one place to another). Urbanization indicates a change of employment structure from agriculture and cottage industries (A usually small-scale industry carried on at home by family members using their own equipment for example Carpet industry) to mass production and service industries (The segment of the economy that provides services to its consumers. This includes a wide range of businesses including financial institutions, schools, transports, and restaurants).This backs up the view that urbanization results from, rather than causes, social change. This is most notable in the development of capitalism (An economic system in which the means of production and distribution are privately or corporately owned and development is proportionate to the accumulation and reinvestment of profits gained in a free market) and its attendant industrialization (The process by which manufacturing industries develop from within a predominantly agrarian society. Characteristic features of industrialization include the application of scientific methods to solving problems, mechanization and a factory system, the division of labor, the growth of the money economy, and the increased mobility of the labor force—both geographically and socially). It is said that the development of the landless laborer and the concentration of wealth into a few hands encourages urbanization. Others argue that urbanization is the inevitable result of economic growth, with the rise of specialized craftsmen, merchants, and administrators. A further view stresses the importance of agglomeration economies (For an industry, the benefits of locating in a densely peopled and highly industrialized situation. The market is large, but concentrated in a relatively small area. Transport costs are therefore low, so that many specialized industries can evolve, since local demand is sufficiently high); bigger Iranian cities offer markets, labor, and capital with a well-developed infrastructure, all of which increase their comparative advantage (A situation in which a country, individual, company or region can produce a good at a lower opportunity cost than that of a competitor).
Rapid population growth--some Persian Gulf states averaged almost 4 percent annual growth in the last two decades(UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia)--has created a large and restive youth population. Rapid population growth is destabilizing for several reasons. First, such growth generates tremendous economic pressure. Simply to retain the same levels of wealth on an individual basis, Persian Gulf economies must grow at rates in excess of 10 percent a year. Second, rapid growth exerts pressure on governments to expand education, medical care, and social services at breakneck speed. Even when governments have considerable wealth, this rapid pace can lead to bottlenecks and inefficiencies. When government revenues are stagnant or declining -- as they are in the Region today -- rapid population growth creates pressures that regimes are not able to satisfy. A rise in expectations accompanied
Urbanization is a relatively recent process in the Third World (Iran, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait) where it is even more rapid than population growth and where the largest agglomerations are growing most rapidly. The negative effects of urbanization include the loss of agricultural land coupled with problems of urban food supply (best examples are: India, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey) the destruction of habitats (The area or type of environment in which a particular kind of animal or plant usually lives).
A comparison of urbanization in Iran to the rest of the world contradicts the national self-image. Iranians have prided themselves on their youth (I need to mention that Iranian population increased between 1980-88 annually by 3.7 per cent) as a nation, which consequently was late to urbanize. However, Teheran was a pioneer among new urbanizing cities (First map of Tehran gives indication the year 1800-1815 and was made by Austrian researcher). Along with Isfahan, Mashad, Tabriz, it was among the very first to feel the effects of the urban-industrial revolution in small scale in smaller cities and larger scale of industries in Tehran (automaker) in Tabriz (Tractor and other agricultural machinery) in Shiraz (petrochemical industry) In Bandar Abbas (Refinery).
At this time Iranian cities like Tehran, Mashad, Shiraz, Isfahan, Karaj are among the most polluted environments in the country. Iranians are used to many of the physical problems of traffic, pollution, deteriorated housing, mismanagements, miss concepts. Failures have come from lack of commitment and political will (recent political development in the last 29 years), not from the inherent nature of cities. The poor are often expected to tax themselves for public services that they cannot afford as private citizens. As in the past century, the centers of our cities display the polarization of society between the very rich and the very poor.
CONCLUSION: The result of rapid Urbanization is Potential Sources of Conflict, THE Persian Gulf states are best defined by what they lack. In an era when democracy is the world's dominant political system, the Persian Gulf regimes are traditional autocracies. Their governments are not accountable, and political alienation and corruption are widespread among the states, which included UAE, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, Qatar. Contrary to popular stereotypes of wealthy and corrupt sheikhs, economic progress has been mixed and uneven(in these particular countries religious minorities are second class people in the society). Demographic pressures squeeze the Persian Gulf states and their populations(increase of political opponents who have been setting in jail because of the political views for many years). Traditional ways of life are under siege, as nomadic, largely illiterate societies have rapidly sedentarized, urbanized, and become educated thanks to high oil price in the recent years. The region's zeitgeist also favors violence, where guerrillas are lauded, and peacemakers ridiculed. Discrimination is rampant against Shi'a Muslims and other minorities (for example in Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia) who form a large segment of several Persian Gulf states' populations. Religious militancy is widespread, threatening to undermine the regional regimes’ legitimacy. As if these problems were not enough. Alone, any one of these problems could lead to unrest Together, they seem to signal disaster.
Pointing out that the socio-economic changes resulting from mismanaged urban planning, is blamed these circumstances for example in Oman, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran for creating a disgruntled and disparate society where the rich were too far removed from the reality of the poor and the lower middle income group which comprises almost 70 per cent Karachi in Pakistan. This marks rise of an elitist society where the gap between the rich and the poor is actually being institutionalized. With globalization commanding only high technology development, the poor class finds itself with no space to live in the cities either and those who resist evictions have their settlements burnt down(for example in Karachi –Pakistan.
Any political changes and unrest in these countries are the result of : lack of Freedom of speech which is the concept of being able to speak freely without censorship. It is often regarded as an integral concept in modern liberal democracies .The right to freedom of speech is guaranteed under international law through numerous human rights instruments, notably under Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 10 of the EuropeanConvention on Human Rights , although implementation remains lacking in many countries(including UAE, Saudi Arabia , Bahrain,Qatar). The synonymous term freedom of expression is sometimes preferred, since the right is not confined to verbal speech but is understood to protect any act of seeking, receiving and imparting information or ideas, regardless of the medium used.
Sources:
THE ENIGMA OF POLITICAL STABILITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF MONARCHIES
By Daniel L. Byman and Jerrold D. Green
Wikipedia (the fee Encyclopedia)
Zachary Schuessler: Urbanization Concepts A Look at an Average Town's Future
Urbanization increasing class disparity: By Maheen Rashdi
The Concepts of Urbanization in Iran and other Persian Gulf countries:
Urbanization, by definition, is the increase in population over time. Urbanization has profound effects on economy, ecology, and lifestyles of the area's inhabitants. Terms such as urban sprawl, urban sociology, and new urbanism are all terms that come as a result of such urbanization. But, urbanization isn't new; rather an old concept that has recently catalyzed into something increasingly more common- a new way of life. Urbanization doesn't necessarily require a trip to the city to see, for example it can be readily viewed just 15 minutes from my hometown, in a town called Metropolitan Tehran, Tabriz, Isfahan or smaller cities like Mahabad, Marivan, Baneh, Bijar, Ilam, Although urbanization would be easier to see in populous areas, urbanization itself, I think, would be much stronger grasped as a concept if done on a developing community, and projecting its future. This town of Baneh has a population of about 113,585(2006). It is a fair sized town, having many things such as a City Hall, Police station, Bookstore, Grocery market, numerous restaurants, and a shopping center (Bazaar). The recent spur of growth in Baneh or Ilam is also readily apparent, and fortunately so that I may analyze such growth as an example. It is astonish and remarkable that the most industrialized part of an urban area in any of Iranian major metropolitans are most usually in or around the center of the town or city. In Isfahan, Mashad or other smaller cities such as Abadan, Dezful, in major cities of UAE (Dubai, Abu Dhabi) and Oman (Manah, Masira, Barka, Bahla) big cities in Saudi Arabia (Riyadh, Al jubayl, Doha, Ahufuf) there is a common square that showcases different businesses and services from food, to other businesses such as Rug dealers, to fruit supplies, and many other things. This small, dense area is both a large factor in employment and a common shopping district for customers. This, of course, would mean that residential areas would have to be near, if one was to obtain a job or shop at these areas. Not even two blocks away, the residents of Iranian cities have housing and apartments all around the square. Ranging from old, two-story houses, to smaller, Apartments in the recent 28 years, and of course older homes that were more often than not shabby and worn.
Traditional urbanization exhibits a concentration of human activities and settlements around the downtown area. When the residential area shifts outward this is called suburbanization( such as suburban cities around tehran were built in the last 50 years).
The increase in the proportion of the population residing in towns, brought about by migration of rural populations into towns and cities (because of many reason for example economical or social circumstances and of course to add the war Iraq against Iran between 1980-88, and/or the higher urban levels of natural (In human ecology, a spontaneously arising and individual area of an urban society with common social, economic, and cultural characteristics: a distinctive community. Most cities contain numbers of natural areas, which are delimited by informal boundaries, such as canals, parks, railways, rivers, and main roads).
Increase resulting from the greater proportion of people of childbearing age in cities this, in turn, reflects patterns of migration (The movement of people from one place to another). Urbanization indicates a change of employment structure from agriculture and cottage industries (A usually small-scale industry carried on at home by family members using their own equipment for example Carpet industry) to mass production and service industries (The segment of the economy that provides services to its consumers. This includes a wide range of businesses including financial institutions, schools, transports, and restaurants).This backs up the view that urbanization results from, rather than causes, social change. This is most notable in the development of capitalism (An economic system in which the means of production and distribution are privately or corporately owned and development is proportionate to the accumulation and reinvestment of profits gained in a free market) and its attendant industrialization (The process by which manufacturing industries develop from within a predominantly agrarian society. Characteristic features of industrialization include the application of scientific methods to solving problems, mechanization and a factory system, the division of labor, the growth of the money economy, and the increased mobility of the labor force—both geographically and socially). It is said that the development of the landless laborer and the concentration of wealth into a few hands encourages urbanization. Others argue that urbanization is the inevitable result of economic growth, with the rise of specialized craftsmen, merchants, and administrators. A further view stresses the importance of agglomeration economies (For an industry, the benefits of locating in a densely peopled and highly industrialized situation. The market is large, but concentrated in a relatively small area. Transport costs are therefore low, so that many specialized industries can evolve, since local demand is sufficiently high); bigger Iranian cities offer markets, labor, and capital with a well-developed infrastructure, all of which increase their comparative advantage (A situation in which a country, individual, company or region can produce a good at a lower opportunity cost than that of a competitor).
Rapid population growth--some Persian Gulf states averaged almost 4 percent annual growth in the last two decades(UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia)--has created a large and restive youth population. Rapid population growth is destabilizing for several reasons. First, such growth generates tremendous economic pressure. Simply to retain the same levels of wealth on an individual basis, Persian Gulf economies must grow at rates in excess of 10 percent a year. Second, rapid growth exerts pressure on governments to expand education, medical care, and social services at breakneck speed. Even when governments have considerable wealth, this rapid pace can lead to bottlenecks and inefficiencies. When government revenues are stagnant or declining -- as they are in the Region today -- rapid population growth creates pressures that regimes are not able to satisfy. A rise in expectations accompanied
Urbanization is a relatively recent process in the Third World (Iran, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Oman, Qatar, Kuwait) where it is even more rapid than population growth and where the largest agglomerations are growing most rapidly. The negative effects of urbanization include the loss of agricultural land coupled with problems of urban food supply (best examples are: India, Iran, Pakistan, Turkey) the destruction of habitats (The area or type of environment in which a particular kind of animal or plant usually lives).
A comparison of urbanization in Iran to the rest of the world contradicts the national self-image. Iranians have prided themselves on their youth (I need to mention that Iranian population increased between 1980-88 annually by 3.7 per cent) as a nation, which consequently was late to urbanize. However, Teheran was a pioneer among new urbanizing cities (First map of Tehran gives indication the year 1800-1815 and was made by Austrian researcher). Along with Isfahan, Mashad, Tabriz, it was among the very first to feel the effects of the urban-industrial revolution in small scale in smaller cities and larger scale of industries in Tehran (automaker) in Tabriz (Tractor and other agricultural machinery) in Shiraz (petrochemical industry) In Bandar Abbas (Refinery).
At this time Iranian cities like Tehran, Mashad, Shiraz, Isfahan, Karaj are among the most polluted environments in the country. Iranians are used to many of the physical problems of traffic, pollution, deteriorated housing, mismanagements, miss concepts. Failures have come from lack of commitment and political will (recent political development in the last 29 years), not from the inherent nature of cities. The poor are often expected to tax themselves for public services that they cannot afford as private citizens. As in the past century, the centers of our cities display the polarization of society between the very rich and the very poor.
CONCLUSION: The result of rapid Urbanization is Potential Sources of Conflict, THE Persian Gulf states are best defined by what they lack. In an era when democracy is the world's dominant political system, the Persian Gulf regimes are traditional autocracies. Their governments are not accountable, and political alienation and corruption are widespread among the states, which included UAE, Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia, Qatar. Contrary to popular stereotypes of wealthy and corrupt sheikhs, economic progress has been mixed and uneven(in these particular countries religious minorities are second class people in the society). Demographic pressures squeeze the Persian Gulf states and their populations(increase of political opponents who have been setting in jail because of the political views for many years). Traditional ways of life are under siege, as nomadic, largely illiterate societies have rapidly sedentarized, urbanized, and become educated thanks to high oil price in the recent years. The region's zeitgeist also favors violence, where guerrillas are lauded, and peacemakers ridiculed. Discrimination is rampant against Shi'a Muslims and other minorities (for example in Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia) who form a large segment of several Persian Gulf states' populations. Religious militancy is widespread, threatening to undermine the regional regimes’ legitimacy. As if these problems were not enough. Alone, any one of these problems could lead to unrest Together, they seem to signal disaster.
Pointing out that the socio-economic changes resulting from mismanaged urban planning, is blamed these circumstances for example in Oman, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Iran for creating a disgruntled and disparate society where the rich were too far removed from the reality of the poor and the lower middle income group which comprises almost 70 per cent Karachi in Pakistan. This marks rise of an elitist society where the gap between the rich and the poor is actually being institutionalized. With globalization commanding only high technology development, the poor class finds itself with no space to live in the cities either and those who resist evictions have their settlements burnt down(for example in Karachi –Pakistan.
Any political changes and unrest in these countries are the result of : lack of Freedom of speech which is the concept of being able to speak freely without censorship. It is often regarded as an integral concept in modern liberal democracies .The right to freedom of speech is guaranteed under international law through numerous human rights instruments, notably under Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and Article 10 of the EuropeanConvention on Human Rights , although implementation remains lacking in many countries(including UAE, Saudi Arabia , Bahrain,Qatar). The synonymous term freedom of expression is sometimes preferred, since the right is not confined to verbal speech but is understood to protect any act of seeking, receiving and imparting information or ideas, regardless of the medium used.
Sources:
THE ENIGMA OF POLITICAL STABILITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF MONARCHIES
By Daniel L. Byman and Jerrold D. Green
Wikipedia (the fee Encyclopedia)
Zachary Schuessler: Urbanization Concepts A Look at an Average Town's Future
Urbanization increasing class disparity: By Maheen Rashdi
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)